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Abstract
This study seeks to analyze the effectiveness of interfaith versus single-faith
peacebuilding programming at reducing levels of violence in instances of violent religious
conflict. After reviewing the literature, I used contact theory and constructivism to form my
hypothesis that interfaith programming is more effective compared to single-faith
programming at reducing violence. Using a mixed-methods approach, I conducted a most
similar systems case study design to analyze the effectiveness of different forms of faithbased programming within the conflict in Northern Ireland. I also analyzed geographical data
to test for relationships between the types of programming and conflict violence. Although
there was not enough data to draw conclusions about my original hypothesis, I formulated an
alternate hypothesis, suggesting that a decrease in conflict violence over time leads to more
opportunities for interfaith programming. This hypothesis was better supported by my
results. The results also provided further support for the arguments put forth by contact
theory and constructivism but showed a need for more systematic data collection on faithbased peacebuilding programming as a whole as well as on its effects and outcomes for
communities.
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Аннотация
В данном исследовании анализируется эффективность программ
межконфессионального и моноконфессионального миростроительства направленного
на снижение уровня насилия в вооруженных религиозных конфликтах. После обзора
литературы я использовала теорию контактов и конструктивизм, чтобы
сформулировать свою гипотезу о том, что межконфессиональное программирование
более эффективно по сравнению с моноконфессиональным программированием в
снижении насилия. Используя смешанный методический подход, я провела наиболее
похожее системное тематическое исследование для анализа эффективности различных
форм религиозного программирования в рамках конфликта в Северной Ирландии. Я
также проанализировала географические данные, чтобы проверить отношения между
типами программирования и конфликтным насилием. Несмотря на отсутствие
достаточного количества данных, чтобы сделать выводы о моей первоначальной
гипотезе, я сформулировала альтернативную гипотезу, утверждающую что
уменьшение насилия в конфликте с течением времени приводит к большему
количеству возможностей для межконфессионального программирования, что было
подтверждено моими результатами. Полученные результаты также послужили
дополнительной поддержкой аргументам, выдвинутым контактной теорией и
конструктивизмом, но показали необходимость более систематического сбора данных
о программах религиозного миростроительства в целом, а также о его последствиях и
результатах для общин.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Almost all religious traditions in the world have been associated at some point in their
history with violence and/or conflict. Just since 1940, around one third of all civil wars and
almost 40% of all violent conflicts involving ethnic minorities have involved religion in
some way (Philpott 2007). Even so, religion also has significant power to create peace, and
religious organizations have the ability to work as effective peacebuilders in areas of conflict.
In the late 20th century, the field of peacebuilding began to expand rapidly as
governments and organizations began to integrate peacebuilding work into many different
sectors, such as economic development or education (Zelizer and Oliphant 2013). During this
same period, the idea that the world was becoming more secular was generally abandoned by
scholars and officials, as it was clear that religion was still impacting people’s lives across
the world (Hertog 2010; Little and Appleby 2004). With both of these phenomena occurring
at once, an increasing number of organizations and programs that carried out peacebuilding
programming began to incorporate faith-based approaches to their work with the idea that
religious conflicts needed religiously-based solutions (Hertog 2010).
Within the field of religious peacebuilding, two types of faith-based programming
exist: single-faith and interfaith. While both forms can be effective at creating more peaceful
communities, each is associated with slightly different outcomes and uses. Currently,
however, no study exists comparing the effectiveness of interfaith versus single-faith
programming at reducing levels of violence within communities. Such a comparison is
important, as the results can direct the form that future faith-based peacebuilding efforts
should take.
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In this study, I aim to compare the effectiveness of each form of faith-based
peacebuilding at reducing levels of violence within communities. I argue that interfaith
peacebuilding programming is more effective than single-faith peacebuilding programming
at reducing levels of violence in instances of violent religious conflict.
In Chapter Two, I review relevant literature on the relationship between religion,
peace, and violence as well as on single-faith and interfaith peacebuilding. After reviewing
the literature, I present the gaps in current literature and present my theoretical argument, in
which I use contact theory and constructivism to develop the hypothesis that interfaith
peacebuilding programming is more effective at reducing levels of violence than single-faith
peacebuilding programming.
In Chapter Three, I describe how I used a mixed-methods approach, with a most
similar systems comparative case study design, in which I compare cases of peacebuilding
programming within a larger case study of religious violence, and Geographic Information
Systems data mapping, to test my hypothesis. I describe my case study choices and discuss
the validity of my approach. I then operationalize the independent variable, the type of
peacebuilding programming, and the dependent variable, the level of violence.
In Chapter Four, I present a summary of my main case study for historical context
before presenting and analyzing the geographical data. I then present findings for three
categories of cases of peacebuilding programming: programming that utilizes both singlefaith and interfaith approaches, single-faith programming, and interfaith programming.
In Chapter Five, I present my conclusions. I summarize my findings that there is not
enough data to provide conclusive proof of my original hypothesis but that there is more
evidence in support of an alternate hypothesis, which is that lower levels of violence lead to
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an increase in interfaith peacebuilding. I then discuss the implications and limitations of my
study. Finally, I suggest possible areas for further research on this topic.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theory
How effective is interfaith programming compared to single-faith programming at
reducing the level of violence in communities facing violent religious conflict? While there is
existing literature on the relationship between religion, violence, and peace as well as on
single-faith and interfaith peacebuilding programming, critical gaps in the literature still
exist. I will review this existing literature, and the gaps within it, before presenting my
theoretical arguments and hypothesis for the topic.

Religion and Violence
Almost all religious traditions have some relationship with violence and conflict,
whether it be in religious texts, rhetoric, history, or practice (Harpviken and Røislien 2018;
Mani 2012: Smock 2002). Religious violence can take the form of both structural or direct
and can occur between different religions, religious sects, or between those with religious
affiliations and those without (or those without sufficient religious zealousness) (Mani 2012).
Religion also does not have to be the main cause of conflict for it to be involved (Mani 2012:
Smock 2002).
Mani (2012) presents seven main characteristics of many religions that are
responsible for fostering violence: the belief that a certain religion is the only truth,
proselytism, anthropocentricism, male authority, the accumulation of political and economic
power, ritualism, and imperviousness to change. Harpviken and Røislien (2008) identify
three different characteristics of religion that, if present, can lead to violence. Religious
violence will be more likely if a religion’s normative system of texts and teachings is thought
to promote or legitimize violence by followers, if religious identities intersect with existing
identity differences in a community (creating an “us” versus “them” dynamic), or if religious
5

organizations partner with the state or other organizations in instances of existing conflict.
Lastly, Davies (2015) provides another outline for how religion can lead to violence. Because
religious beliefs tend to be exclusive, individuals may begin to believe that their religion is
not just the only truth but also inherently superior to all other systems of belief. This may
then lead to adherents of the religion to believe that they themselves are superior to people
from different religious traditions. This can lead to intolerance and, in some cases, direct
violence against people from other traditions who are seen as wrong or lesser-than.
Because religious beliefs tend to be exclusive, religious conflicts often become
intractable (Davies 2015). As religious conflicts are oftentimes presented as divinely
ordained, religion can help overcome the collective action problem in civil wars by providing
strong motivation for enough people to join a violent rebel group that the group is
sufficiently able to organize against the state (Basedau, Pfeiffer, and Vüllers 2016; Davies
2015). Religion may also motivate participation in violent conflict, as people may believe
that a divine entity will protect them or reward them for their actions (Basedau, Pfeiffer, and
Vüllers 2016; Davies 2015).
It is also easier for religious-based rebel groups to overcome the collective action
problem when one religious group is dominant in a state, as other smaller groups might align
together in rebellion, or when a state is made up of two relatively equally-sized religious
groups, as these groups are more likely to become polarized, making religious identities and
differences more salient and motivating collective action (Basedau, Pfeiffer, and Vüllers
2016). More than anything, the risk of armed conflict greatly increases when religious
identities intersect with other differences, such as ethnicity or economic status (Augustine
and Wong 2009; Basedau, Pfeiffer, and Vüllers 2016; Philpott 2007). Ethnicity in particular
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can play a powerful role in religious conflict; in areas where religious and ethnic identities
overlap, armed conflict is almost twice as likely when religion and ethnicity do not overlap
(Basedau, Pfeiffer, and Vüllers 2016). As these identities overlap, nationalism can also
become intertwined, thereby creating a situation in which communities are divided across
religious, ethnic, and political lines, creating even more motives for conflict (Augustine and
Wong 2009; Philpott 2007).

Religion and Peace
Although many aspects of religion can act as causal forces for violence, when viewed
or utilized differently, religion has significant power to create peace. Peace is a core ideal to
almost all major religions and is often key in providing the motivation for many faithful to
work towards peace, with some religions even considering peace work a sign of commitment
and faithfulness (Davies 2015; Huda and Marshall 2013; Hertog 2010). Beyond just
overarching ideas of peace, religious traditions often also promote ideas such as nonviolence,
care for all life, empathy, generosity, service, and truth, among many other ideas (Davies
2015; Hertog 2010). Furthermore, religion can provide people with specific views for how
the world should be, as well as guidelines to judge right versus wrong (Hertog 2010).
Within most communities, but especially those with a deeply religious culture,
religious actors can play important roles in conflict situations by continuing to provide social,
education, and health services even when states or other organizations have stopped
providing them (Davies 2015; Huda and Marshall 2013). Standing in between the private and
public sphere, and generally with voluntary participation by community members, religious
institutions can be considered part of civil society (Berger 2005; Brewer, Higgins, and
Teeney 2011). This intermediate position between the state and local communities gives
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religious institutions the unique ability to communicate between these two spheres to
mitigate conflict (Berger 2005; Brewer, Higgins, and Teeney 2011). Many times, the
physical structures of the religious institutions (temples, synagogues, churches, etc.) also act
as meeting places for other civil society organizations, increasing contact between religious
groups and other groups that might be working on peace and conflict issues (Brewer,
Higgins, and Teeney 2011).
Because of this community-based nature, religious actors are also able to observe
conflicts from the ground level and will likely have information and community connections
that can aid in mediation and reconciliation processes (Davies 2015; Huda and Marshall
2013; Hertog 2010). Religious actors also tend to have a variety of communication methods
available, including sermons, newspapers, public events, etc. for them to spread messages of
peace and mobilize people towards peaceful causes (Hertog 2010).
Although religion can be a cause of violent communal conflict or civil war, it can also
have a pacifying effect. Conflict is likely to occur when religion and other identities overlap,
but many times the members of religious institutions come from across political, economic,
and/or ethnic divides, reducing polarization and increasing cooperation (De Juan, Pierskalla,
and Vüllers 2015; Fox 2004). Besides these horizontal links across societal divisions,
religious institutions often also have vertical links through an institutional hierarchy that can
help mitigate communal conflict. Higher level bodies may depend on local-level institutions
to settle conflicts in their own communities, as people often feel a greater connection and
sense of trust with their local institutions (De Juan, Pierskalla, and Vüllers 2015). At other
times, local institutions may rely on those at the top of the hierarchy to mitigate conflict, as
they have a wider network of influence, oftentimes including political influence (Fox 2004).
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Institutional hierarchies ultimately allow peacebuilding to occur at multiple levels, from
grassroots efforts to official diplomacy (Hertog 2010: Smock 2002).

Peacebuilding
There is no single definition of peacebuilding, but it is generally considered to
encompass activities that take place after or towards the end of a conflict, involving creating
functioning institutions and reconciliation efforts to create a more stable peace (Zelizer and
Oliphant 2013). The peacebuilding field has expanded rapidly in the past few decades from
involving mainly government agencies or the United Nations to encompassing thousands of
nongovernmental organizations, including many that have integrated peacebuilding programs
into existing programs focused on economic development, health, education, etc. (Zelizer
and Oliphant 2013).
Peacebuilding programming can be both top-down, focused on the leaders of states or
organizations, or bottom-up, involving everyday citizens. While both can be effective at
fostering dialogue or conflict resolution, community-based bottom-up peacebuilding is often
seen as more sustainable long-term (Hemmer, Garb, Phillips, and Graham 2006). One
argument for community-based peacebuilding is that, because most communal conflict
involves everyday citizens as participants and/or victims, these citizens should be directly
involved in the peace process so that any agreement will reflect their needs and concerns
(Conteh-Morgan 2005). Everyday citizens also tend to feel that, as individuals, they can have
more of an impact on the peace process at the local level and will be more motivated to
support bottom-up programming in which they feel involved over top-down programming
from which they feel disconnected (Hemmer et al. 2006). Additionally, this form of
peacebuilding is useful when leaders are either unable or unwilling to reach any kind of
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agreement; in fact, some leaders may benefit from the status-quo and not want to become
involved with any peacebuilding initiatives (Hemmer et al. 2006). However, if enough
citizens participate in bottom-up programs, leaders may feel pressure from citizens to begin
engaging in top-down initiatives as well (Dovidio, Saguy, and Shambel 2009; Hemmer et al.
2006).
In the late 20th century, politicians and academics around the world began to abandon
the idea from the earlier part of the century that the world was becoming more secular, in
favor of recognizing the important role religion played in society, politics, and conflict
(Hertog 2010; Little and Appleby 2004). With this development, an increasing number of
organizations began to combine peacebuilding efforts with religious programs and ideas.
Because religion has many qualities that can lead to peace, such as teachings on empathy,
nonviolence, service, etc., religious programming can be used for peacebuilding in
nonreligious conflicts; however, it is most often used in conflicts where religion plays a
significant role (Hertog 2010). Like other forms of peacebuilding programming, religious
peacebuilding programming can be classified as top-down (involving mostly religious
leaders) or bottom-up (involving everyday citizens who identify with a certain religious
tradition). A variety of actors can carry out peacebuilding programming, including traditional
religious organizations, such as churches, mosques, temples, etc., as well as many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The programming provided by these actors can either
be classified as single-faith or interfaith based on the number of religious groups or sects it
targets.

Single-faith Peacebuilding
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Overall, there is a dearth of literature regarding single-faith peacebuilding. However,
there has been literature written about the use and effectiveness of intragroup dialogue within
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which itself has religious underpinnings, as well as on using
affinity groups within racial justice dialogue. While these programs might not focus
specifically on religion, I argue that many of the processes and participant experiences in
affinity groups will function similarly to how single-faith peacebuilding programing
operates.
Intragroup, or affinity group, dialogue is where participants with shared identities
gather to meet and discuss their experiences, usually directly related to that identity
(Sternberg, Hirsch, and Sagy 2018; Tauriac, Kim, Sariñana, Tawa, and Kahn 2013). This
type of programming is often seen as useful for peacebuilding or social justice as it allows
people of different identities to gather in their own spaces, surrounded by people who have
likely had similar life experiences in relation to that shared identity (Tauriac et al. 2013). In
the safe space of the group, participants are able to speak freely and “test out” ideas without
the concern of offending or harming people in the outgroup and without people in the affinity
group becoming overly defensive about their past experiences (David et al. 2017; Tauriac et
al. 2013; Walls, Roll, and Sprague 2010). Intragroup or affinity group dialogue is also useful
in situations where participants are unable to realistically meet, either because the conflict
situation is still too dangerous, because members of the ingroup and outgroup are too
separated geographically, or because there are other constraints that make it difficult to
gather in person (Zigenlaub and Sagy 2020).
These groups can also be valuable for participants who have never spent much time
thinking about or discussing their own identity. While some people found this challenging,
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especially when discussing previously unknown or ignored privileges related to their identity,
others found the opportunity valuable for self-reflection and for starting a journey towards
allyship with the outgroup (Michael and Conger 2009; Tauriac et al. 2013; Walls et al. 2010).
David et al. (2017) found that self-reflection was a key part of successful programming, as
this mental process is what ultimately allowed participants to perceive both the ingroup and
outgroup as having diverse identities, beyond those of the conflict, and acknowledge
responsibility within the ingroup for committing acts of violence or discrimination against
the outgroup. Many participants find self-reflection difficult, however, as it poses a threat to
their perception of themselves as moral or just (David et al. 2017). The emotional challenge
of self-reflection may even cause some participants to disengage from the program (David et
al. 2017).
Some participants also had deeply emotional experiences in the affinity groups, as
they were able to release any pent-up frustration, anger, or pain with people they knew would
likely be empathetic (Tauriac et al. 2013). Moreover, affinity groups are an effective way for
people to start learning more about the outgroup without putting the burden entirely on
people in the outgroup to educate them (Michael and Conger 2009).
When implemented in communities facing violent conflict, a large goal of intragroup
dialogue is for participants to understand the conflict narrative of the outgroup while selfreflecting about their own conflict narrative (Sternberg et al. 2018; Zigenlaub and Sagy
2020). This is done in the hopes that participants will challenge their own beliefs about truth
and justice in relation to the conflict and become more open to accepting alternate narratives,
reducing the sense that each side’s beliefs and narrative are intractable and that an opposing
narrative is a threat to one’s own identity (David et al. 2017; Sternberg et al. 2018). In fact,
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participants in intragroup dialogue who were able to acknowledge the legitimacy of an
opposing conflict narrative held more optimistic views about the possibilities of future
reconciliation (David et al. 2017)
Intragroup or affinity group dialogue also often incorporates discussion within the
ingroup about participants’ other identities, such as gender, sexuality, socioeconomic status,
physical ability, etc. (Sternberg et al. 2018; Zigenlaub and Sagy 2020). By encouraging
participants to recognize the diversity within the ingroup and practice challenging stereotypes
they might hold for other aspects of people’s identities, participants will be better prepared to
recognize the diversity of the outgroup and critically examine any stereotypes towards the
outgroup as well (David et al. 2017; Sternberg et al. 2018). These exercises also allowed
participants in the dialogue to recognize that people in the outgroup might actually share
some aspects of their identity (Sternberg et al. 2018). For example, Israeli youth in an
intragroup dialogue program discussed how they might actually have more in common with
Palestinian youth than they do with older generations of Israelis, which served to reduce fear
and uncertainty about Palestinian youth in the outgroup (Sternberg et al. 2018). Reducing
feelings of fear towards the outgroup is especially important, since fear is often used as a
justification for violence (Sternberg et al. 2018). However, these exercises have also led
some participants in intragroup dialogue programs to disengage with the peacebuilding
process, as they believed it was necessary to deal with stereotypes and prejudice about
diverse identities within the ingroup first, before addressing the larger conflict (Sternberg et
al. 2018).
Intragroup dialogue programs also face challenges because ingroup members are not
directly engaging with outgroup members and therefore cannot actually engage in
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reconciliation processes. Even though participants in intragroup dialogue expressed greater
willingness to engage in reconciliation efforts with the outgroup, they questioned whether
members of the outgroup shared this feeling and were in favor of reconciliation (Sternberg et
al. 2018). The demonstrated positive results of intragroup dialogue include acceptance of
alternative narratives and reduced stereotyping, fear, and hatred of the outgroup. However, it
is unclear whether these programs can actually change the core collective narratives within
the conflict or only affect peripheral beliefs (David et al. 2017; Sternberg et al. 2018;
Zigenlaub and Sagy 2020).

Interfaith Peacebuilding
Although it is clear that single-faith programming is doing important peacebuilding
work across the globe, this is only one type of faith-based peacebuilding. Unlike single-faith
programming, Interfaith programming explicitly includes people of multiple religions or
religious sects with the goal of creating greater tolerance, trust, or understanding between the
people involved. Interfaith programming has become an increasingly popular peacebuilding
tool used across the world in instances of violence along religious lines.
Interfaith programming can take many forms, including high-level dialogues between
religious leaders or grassroots community efforts (Smock 2002). Goals of these efforts can
also vary; they can be forums for mediation or reconciliation or forums for greater
understanding of other religions, often highlighting similarities across religious traditions
(Merdjanova 2011; Smock 2002). In each case, interfaith programming ultimately works to
build relationships between participants, primarily through dialogue or work on collective
projects. By building relationships, participants are better able to directly understand the key
motivations, issues, and interests of the other party as well as humanize one another
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(Hemmer et al. 2006). Neufeldt (2011) states that interfaith programming can create change
through dialogue using three different orientations: political, theological, and peacebuilding.
Political dialogue focuses on creating messages of coexistence and harmony between
multiple groups to delegitimize violent actors (Neufeldt 2011). Theological dialogue is
primarily concerned with creating understanding across religious groups by highlighting
similarities across traditions (Neufeldt 2011). This form of dialogue, in particular, is useful
for eliciting humanizing responses from participants (Soukup and Keaton 2013). By
recognizing that other religious traditions have similar truths and values, participants’
uncertainty and fear towards others can be reduced (Soukup and Keaton 2013). This is
particularly important in instances of violent religious conflict because of the intractability of
most religious traditions, which present a certain religion as the only truth and create an “us
vs. them” dynamic with people from other religious traditions (Harpviken and Røislien 2008;
Mani 2012; Pickett et al. 2014).
A peacebuilding perspective works to create community support for peace on the
basis of both religion and mutual respect (Neufeldt 2011). It works to address and discuss the
root causes of violent conflict and extend peace work beyond the confines of the interfaith
program into the larger community, which is important since religious conflicts are most
often communal (Neufeldt 2011). In discussing the causes of conflict, this form of dialogue
often circles around the conflict narrative of each party. Like in single-faith peacebuilding,
understanding the conflict narrative of the opposing side is important both for understanding
the motivations of the opposing side and for finding mutual points of interest that both sides
can work towards (Hemmer et al. 2006; Patel, Kunze, and Silverman 2008). Interfaith
programming is different, however, in that it allows participants to hear narratives directly
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from other participants with whom they have begun to form relationships, leading to greater
acceptance of other conflict narratives and decreasing opportunities for miscommunication or
misunderstanding (Patel, Kunze, and Silverman 2008). Interfaith approaches also provide an
opportunity for participants to create a new narrative together that encompasses the history
and beliefs of all sides (Hemmer et al. 2006; Patel, Kunze, and Silverman 2008).
Reconciliation is often seen as one of the most important goals of interfaith
peacebuilding, as it requires participants, both as individuals and as part of their religious
group, to establish or rebuild connections with people on the opposing side of the conflict
(Smock 2002). The ability of interfaith programming to foster reconciliation differentiates it
from single-faith programming. Because intragroup dialogue programs do not provide
participants with opportunities for direct contact and dialogue with the outgroup, the program
can foster a willingness to reconcile within participants but cannot actually create
reconciliation (David et al. 2017; Pickett et al. 2014; Tam, Hewstone, Kenworthy, and Cairns
2009). True reconciliation requires that participants not only have an understanding of one
another’s beliefs but also view each other with mutual trust and respect as human beings
(United States Institute of Peace 2003). Reconciliation is a psychological process that can
require significant time and effort on behalf of the participants (Tam et al. 2009; United
States Institute of Peace 2003). This means that interfaith peacebuilding programs should be
long-lasting in order to give participants time to process their beliefs surrounding their own
actions and role in the conflict, those of the outgroup, and the conflict as a whole in order to
achieve reconciliation (Tam et al. 2009; United States Institute of Peace 2003).
In order to achieve reconciliation, participants in interfaith programs must first feel as
though they can trust one another (Tam et al. 2009). Trust can lead to reconciliation as it

16

promotes conciliatory rather than coercive bargaining strategies between groups, creating
opportunities for a resolution to the conflict that incorporates the interests of both parties
(Pickett et al. 2014; Tam et al. 2009). Moreover, because religious conflicts are often viewed
as intractable in the eyes of participants, trust is important as it can reduce the feeling of zerosum threats (Hemmer et al. 2006; Pickett et al. 2014). When groups have mutual trust, they
are able to risk some vulnerability in peacebuilding processes with assurance that they will
not be exploited or harmed (Hemmer et al. 2006; Pickett et al. 2014; Tam et al. 2009).
Because trust involves risk on behalf of participants, creating trust, and thereby creating the
possibility of reconciliation, demands direct and extended contact between both groups in
order to facilitate enough positive intergroup encounters that participants feel they can trust
each other (Pettigrew, Tropp, Wagner, and Christ 2011; Tam et al. 2009).
Interfaith programming is most successful when it ensures that all groups in the
program have equal status, come prepared to cooperate, have common goals, and are
supported by the wider community to engage in an intergroup peacebuilding process
(Pettigrew et al. 2011; Pickett et al. 2014; Tam et al. 2009). Even if there are severe
inequalities within the community, a balance of power between religious groups within the
program is important, as groups that hold the majority within dialogue groups will often
consciously or unconsciously dominate the discussion, silencing the group in the minority
(Dovidio, Saguy, and Shambel 2009; Smock 2002). Even if done unconsciously, this action
on behalf of the majority group will perpetuate the feelings of distrust and hurt felt by the
minority group because they will not feel that their views are being heard within the dialogue
(Dovidio, Saguy, and Shambel 2009). A balance of power, along with clear ground rules for

17

the program, will make the space feel safer for participants, as they will feel as though the
program is not biased towards any group (Neufeldt 2011).
In order to provide participants with the opportunity to practice cooperation and
developing common goals, interfaith programing oftentimes involves participation in some
kind of collaborative task (Smock 2002). A collaborative task could be something formal like
the establishment of a youth organization or something informal such as cross-community
meals. Since people are often unwilling or unable to express their true feelings in dialogues,
collective projects will allow participants to show their trust and willingness to work together
(Smock 2002). For instance, in Bosnia, an interfaith choir was formed that incorporated
music from a wide variety of religious traditions (United States Institute of Peace 2003). This
informal experience allowed the singers to become more familiar with the religious traditions
and cultures of other ethnic groups within Bosnia and helped participants see everyone in the
group as fellow humans with shared interests rather than enemies or “others” (United States
Institute of Peace 2003). Through gathering a diverse array of people to create collective
music, this program also provided participants with a low-stakes environment in which they
could practice working together (United States Institute of Peace 2003).
Having community support for interfaith programming is also important, since
interfaith dialogue often faces backlash from communities that distrust the idea of such
programs or are not yet ready to engage with a conflicting group (Merdjanova 2011; Neufeldt
2011; Pettigrew et al. 2011). A lack of acceptance could lead to an increase in risks
associated with participating in a program and reduce the number of people willing to join in
dialogue (Pettigrew et al. 2011; United States Institute of Peace 2003). In areas where
intergroup hostility remains high, leaders and/or participants in interfaith programs may face
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retaliation or violence from hardliners in their communities who view anyone making
concessions or contact with people on the other side of the conflict as traitors (Hemmer et al.
2006; Sternberg, Hirsch, and Sagy 2018; United States Institute of Peace 2003).
Ultimately, if participants have a positive experience in the program, they are more
likely to have positive attitudes towards people from the opposing side of the conflict in the
future as well. This is because positive contact can have secondary transfer effects:
participants who come to like members from the opposing side within the program tend to
generalize these feelings and become more accepting of the outgroup overall (Pettigrew et al.
2011; Pickett et al. 2014). In comparison, because single-faith programs do not offer direct
contact with people from other groups, this secondary transfer effect among participants does
not occur.
It is also important to note that single-faith and interfaith approaches to
peacebuilding can be used in conjunction with one another, where participants would attend a
single-faith program as a preliminary step to an interfaith program (David et al. 2017;
Sternberg, Hirsch, and Sagy 2018). In this case, the interfaith programming does not negate
what was accomplished by participants in the single-faith section but instead builds off of
their accomplishments. The fact that single-faith programming is sometimes followed by
further interfaith programming supports the idea that interfaith peacebuilding is more
effective.

Gaps in the Literature
The most significant gap in the existing literature on this topic is that there is no
literature directly comparing the effectiveness of interfaith programming to single-faith
programming. The literature is also rather weak regarding how effective each of these forms
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of programming are individually. It is unclear how much of a role single-faith or interfaith
programming plays in creating greater intergroup tolerance and understanding, for example,
or how much a reduction in violence within a community is actually related to these types of
faith-based efforts. Additionally, while there is a wealth of literature regarding interfaith
programming, the amount of available literature on single-faith programming is much more
limited, possibly due to the unwillingness of different programs to brand themselves as such
or possibly because much of religious peacebuilding today is in some way interfaith. My
study will fill in the gaps by analyzing and comparing the effectiveness of single-faith versus
interfaith programming on reducing levels of violence in instances of violent religious
conflict.

Theoretical Argument
Based on the conclusions made by the existing literature, I argue that interfaith
peacebuilding programming will be more successful compared to single-faith programming
at reducing levels of violence in communities facing violent religious conflict. While singlefaith programming might also see some success, the exclusivity of religious beliefs and
intractability of religious conflicts warrants the need for interfaith programming.
Contact theory provides a useful framework for how positive contact with people on
opposing sides of a conflict may provide openings and support for peace, especially in
intractable conflicts, like many religious conflicts. This theory poses that trust, tolerance, and
reconciliation can be created between different sides of a conflict by providing members of
each side opportunities to meet and form relationships with people on the other side
(Pettigrew et al. 2011; Pickett et al. 2011). While certain conditions to the contact, such as a
balance of power among participants or opportunities to develop common goals, will greatly
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enhance the positive benefits of contact, any contact among people in opposing parties will
lead to an increased level of understanding among participants towards one another and a
greater humanizing response (Pettigrew et al. 2011). Moreover, this positive response
extends beyond the individuals directly involved in the contact; participants in contact
programs tend to generalize their feelings towards outgroup members within the contact
program to outgroup members in general.
Participants in single-faith programming can possibly still achieve greater tolerance
and understanding of others through learning about different religions in an environment
where participants feel comfortable, however achieving trust, reconciliation, justice, and/or
forgiveness cannot happen without all parties of the conflict coming together in dialogue
(Tam et al. 2009). Interfaith programming is helpful for reducing levels of violence primarily
by building trust between people of different communities. Interfaith peacebuilding aims to
humanize people from other religious traditions by allowing people to be vulnerable in
dialogue, share their own beliefs, learn the beliefs of others, discover similarities between
groups, and build relationships across conflict lines, all of which require some level of trust
between participants (Hemmer et al. 2006; Pickett et al. 2014; Smock 2002; Tam et al. 2009).
Interfaith peacebuilding also is focused heavily on reconciliation. In order to achieve
this, both parties to the conflict must admit their own roles within the conflict and agree to
reconcile. By both admitting to guilt on some level, a level of trust between the groups can be
better achieved as one group will not feel victimized within the process (Smock 2002). While
single-faith programs can promote a willingness to trust or reconcile among participants,
because these participants do not have contact with people in the other group, they cannot
actually achieve trust or reconciliation (David et al. 2017; Pickett et al. 2014; Tam et al.
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2009). These phenomena are ultimately a result of changing attitudes and norms among
participants, and although attitudes and norms can change without direct contact, norm
changes are stronger with direct contact (Pettigrew et al. 2011).
Constructivism is a useful theory for looking at the importance of norm changes in
reducing violence. Constructivists find peacebuilding programs useful because they believe
that such programs can create new peaceful norms among participants and, with intergroup
programs, develop an intersubjective understanding of the conflict and possibilities for peace
(Conteh-Morgan 2005; David 2001; Guzzini 2000). This differs from traditional realist
theory, which questions the usefulness of peacebuilding in communal conflict. Realists see
communal conflict mainly as a result of a security dilemma between competing groups,
whereby competition for power and a lack of trust between groups leads to both sides
attempting to maximize security (David 2001; Hill 2006). This ultimately makes both sides
less secure and creates opportunities for conflict, especially when groups share a
geographical space (Hill 2006). Unless peacebuilding programs can fix the underlying
differences in power leading to insecurity among groups, realists do not see peacebuilding
programs as effective long-term in communal conflict (Conteh-Morgan 2005; David 2001).
The goal of intergroup peacebuilding in the eyes of constructivists is to develop
enough trust from participants on each side of the conflict that both sides will follow the
newly established norms of peace and will be willing to disarm even if the underlying causes
of a security dilemma still exist (Hill 2006). Participants in peacebuilding programming
choose to participate because they see that the current environment in their community has
led to conflict and want to create a new and better environment (Conteh-Morgan 2005). With
intergroup peacebuilding programs, people on both sides of a conflict have the chance to
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interact together in a controlled environment and begin to develop relationships with one
another as well as shared ideas about peace and reconciliation. Through continuous positive
interaction, participants in the program develop new norms of interaction with one another
that are not centered around mistrust, discrimination, or violence. Hopefully, these new
norms will then spread beyond the reach of the program into the wider community, leading to
the creation of peaceful norms at the community level (Conteh-Morgan 2005; Pettigrew et al.
2011; Pickett et al. 2014). With these norms established at a community level, violence will
likely be reduced as it will no longer be viewed as an acceptable means by which to resolve
conflicts between different groups in the community.
Constructivism also works to explain the creation of intersubjective understanding
among groups or individuals, which is also key to the success of intergroup peacebuilding
(Guzzini 2000). Although intragroup peacebuilding can change the subjective understanding
of participants about the realities of the conflict and possibilities for peace with the
conflicting group, the lack of contact and dialogue with people from the conflicting group
means that this type of peacebuilding cannot change the intersubjective understanding of
participants. When people on both sides of a conflict develop an intersubjective
understanding about the causes and realities of the conflict as well as the goals, motivations,
and beliefs of those on the opposing side, they are able to construct a new reality from that
understanding (Conteh-Morgan 2005; Guzzini 2000). Moreover, the emergence of trusting
relationships among participants in interfaith programming allows participants to develop
more tolerant and reconciliatory attitudes towards others, better preparing them to accept a
new shared reality (Abu-Nimer 2001). Ultimately, the development of intersubjective
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understanding among groups reduces reasons for conflict by providing fewer opportunities
for disagreement.
For interfaith peacebuilding specifically, the goal is to recognize the validity of each
sides’ unique religious beliefs while developing a new shared understanding based around
the similarities found in both religious traditions alongside the other shared values, concerns,
and beliefs discovered amongst participants throughout the peacebuilding process (Patel,
Kunze, and Silverman 2008). Because most religious traditions have shared values and
beliefs surrounding peace, interfaith programming may actually give participants an
advantage or head-start in forming shared understanding compared to non-religious
peacebuilding programming.
However, interfaith programming can face challenges due to the exclusivity of
religious beliefs. Participants may resist any kind of intersubjective understanding between
conflicting groups because they may view such an understanding as violating their belief that
their religion is the only truth (Abu-Nimer 2001). Interfaith programming also faces
challenges if communities are not ready to accept interactions with people on opposite sides
of a conflict, as this can create risks for participants in the program (Merdjanova 2011;
Neufeldt 2011; Pettigrew et al. 2011). Interfaith programming will therefore be more
successful when the risks faced by those participating in such programs are relatively low.

Hypothesis
I hypothesize that communities facing violent religious conflict in which members
participate in interfaith peacebuilding programming will see lower levels of violence within
that community than if members participate in single-faith peacebuilding programming. In
testing this hypothesis, I also hope to refute my null hypothesis, which is that communities
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facing violent religious conflict in which members participate in interfaith peacebuilding
programming will see the same or higher level of violence compared to participation in
single-faith programming.
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Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology
In the previous section, I discussed the existing literature on the topic as well as my
theory and hypothesis. In this section, I present my research design and methodology that I
used to investigate my hypothesis. I will explain how I used a mixed methods approach with
a comparative case study and geographical data analysis for my research as well as present
and operationalize my variables.

Research Design
To test my hypothesis, I used a comparative case study method, which Kaarbo and
Beasley (1999) define as a “systematic comparison” of two or more data points or instances
“without manipulating either the phenomenon or the context,” (372). While much existing
literature on religious peacebuilding has utilized a single case study method (Coward and
Smith 2004; Esposito and Yilmaz 2013; Hertog 2010; Matyok et al. 2013; Merdjanova and
Brodeur 2011; Smock 2002), comparative case studies have also been used (Brewer 2011,
Higgins, and Teeney 2011; Power 2011b), though a comparative approach has not been used
to specifically analyze interfaith versus single-faith approaches to peacebuilding. For this
study, a comparative method was needed to analyze interfaith versus single-faith
peacebuilding programming within a single case of violent religious conflict.
I used the most similar systems model for case studies, as I looked at how levels of
violence changed within communities when members of that community participated in
interfaith peacebuilding programming compared to single-faith peacebuilding programming.
To decide on what cases to use, I first had to decide on an instance of violent religious
conflict within which I would analyze peacebuilding programming. I first gathered
information from Religious Tolerance, a website by the Ontario Consultants on Religious
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Tolerance, to establish a sample (Religious Tolerance n.d.). I then decided to look only at
cases where the conflict occurred after 1945 in order to present more modern and relevant
results. I also avoided conflicts that were primarily one-sided or where the conflict was
mainly between religious versus nonreligious actors, as I am interested in looking at
peacebuilding programming between religious actors who have both been involved in
violence. Lastly, I removed cases from my initial list that did not have sufficient existing
literature on religious peacebuilding programming within that conflict. After applying these
criteria, I was left with the conflicts in Northern Ireland, Israel-Palestine, and Bosnia and
Herzegovina. In the end, I decided to look at the conflict in Northern Ireland since it would
be easiest to find English-language sources.
For the comparative aspect of my case study, I looked for both single-faith and
interfaith peacebuilding programming in Northern Ireland. Specifically, I searched for
programs that were active during the main period of the conflict between around 1968 to
1998 and included a bottom-up, community-based approach. Although the organizations or
groups that carried out faith-based peacebuilding programming did not need to have an
explicit religious or peacebuilding focus, the programming itself did need to include
discussions or activities explicitly dealing with religion and peacebuilding.
I used a variety of sources to find examples of faith-based peacebuilding
programming. I first used lists of religious and peacebuilding organizations in Northern
Ireland found through the Irish Council of Churches and Peace Insight websites (Irish
Council of Churches 2015; McKinley 2011; Peace Insight n.d.), newspapers such as The
Irish Times and Belfast Telegraph as well as through a variety of scholarly books and articles
on the conflict in Northern Ireland (Church, Visser, and Johnson 2004; Gallagher 1982;
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Ganiel 2008a; Grant 2004; Hughes and Knox 1997; Power 2011b) to create an initial list of
possible organizations and groups that carried out faith-based peacebuilding programming.
From this initial list, I searched for websites for the various programs to gather more
information on the nature of the program, such as when the program was in operation and
whether the program was community-based. If I could not find a website for a certain
program, I then searched online for any news articles or scholarly sources that documented
their work. I also searched for contact information for each program. While searching for
further information on these programs, I often came across references to other peacebuilding
programs not included in my original search that I was able to add to my list of programs.
From these sources, I was able to create an initial list of 120 programs to review, of which I
was able to find contact information for 38. To compare the different cases of faith-based
programming, I am using a multi-method approach of interviews along with data mapping
through geographic information systems (GIS) software.

Interviews
Participants in interviews are all either program leaders or program participants who
have experience with one of the faith-based peacebuilding programming cases. I planned to
interview people who have experience with single-faith peacebuilding programming as well
as those who have experience with interfaith, aiming for an equal number of both. All
participants must also all be at least 18 years old. Through interviews, I was able to gather
more information from first-hand accounts on what effect program leaders or participants
believe each type of faith-based peacebuilding programming had on levels of violence within
communities as well as on what aspects of the programming they believe led to such
outcomes.
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To contact participants, I first sent out preliminary emails to all of the cases of faithbased programming for which I had obtained contact information to ask whether anyone at
the organization would be willing to answer questions about the effectiveness of single-faith
or interfaith peacebuilding programming on reducing levels of violence or whether they
could connect me with someone who might be willing. Once I was connected with people
who were willing to answer questions with regard to the study, I sent them more specific
emails asking about their willingness to participate in a short interview. Within the interview
itself, I also included a question asking participants if there is anyone else that they think I
should contact, with the goal that this might help me connect with other possible interview
participants through snowball sampling.
Within the interview, participants were asked a variety of questions about their
experiences with faith-based peacebuilding programming and their perception of its effects
on themselves, other participants, and the wider community. Because each case of
programming was different, the interviews were semi-structured; the semi-structured
questions allowed participants to answer the questions that were most relevant for their
experience and give more in-depth information about each response. Upon completion of the
interviews, I used the interview responses to consider whether common themes are expressed
by those who have experience with single-faith programming as well as those with interfaith
programming regarding the effectiveness of each. I also analyzed responses to see whether
one form of faith-based peacebuilding is considered more effective. To protect the identity of
participants, all information gathered in the interviews was held confidential unless they
requested specifically to be named (specific interview procedures, questions, and the
interview consent form can be found in Appendix A).
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Data Mapping
As part of the study, I also used GIS mapping to analyze trends in the relationship
between the establishment of faith-based peacebuilding programming and instances of direct
violence over time. I began with the same initial list of 120 cases of programming; with data
mapping, I could include cases of programming that I could not use for interviews due to a
lack of contact information. For any cases for which I could not find an exact address, I used
the most specific location available, such as the neighborhood or area of town in which it was
located. Similarly, for any cases in which I could not find exact confirmation of the year the
program began operating, I used the earliest year of operations for which I could find
reference. However, I did have to fully exclude programs for which I could not find any
specific references to a location, dates of operation, and/or type of programming.
Cases of programming that bring people out of their own communities to a different
location to engage in peacebuilding programming also could not be included in the map;
unless data was available for where the participants lived, the inclusion of this form of faithbased programming would skew the geographical aspects of the data. Additionally, programs
that operate throughout Northern Ireland could only be included if the program offered
specific locations of their operations, as without specific geographic locations, the cases
could not be plotted on the map.
In order to analyze trends between violence and peacebuilding programming, the data
on cases of programming needed to be plotted against data on conflict deaths in Northern
Ireland from 1969-2005 (McKeown 2009), which also meant that only cases of
peacebuilding programming that existed during that time frame could be included. This
dataset was originally compiled in 2009 with data on conflict deaths from 1969 to 2001 but
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was updated in 2013 to include data up until 2005. With these criteria, I was able to plot 62
cases of faith-based peacebuilding programming on the GIS map.
Through GIS mapping, I was able to see if a relationship exists between the
geographical locations of instances of violence and the locations of both single-faith and
interfaith programming over time in Northern Ireland. Although any trends observed through
mapping cannot establish direct causation between either type of faith-based peacebuilding
and levels of violence within communities, it can show any relationships that exists between
these two variables.

Validity
This approach does create a problem for external validity, since I am looking at
specific programs within one instance of violent religious conflict. While my findings may
not be applicable to every case of violent religious conflict due to differences in the religious,
historical, cultural, political, or economic background of a conflict, this research can provide
a starting point for comparing interfaith and single-faith programming, as no such research
exists at this point. For internal validity, while I tried to find cases of programming that were
similar in structure (community-based and with religion as a central topic), each case of
programming is still different. Because I could not control for all the differences between
cases of programming, the dependent variable could be affected by factors that are not
directly related to the differences between single-faith and interfaith programming.
Furthermore, because many factors outside of these peacebuilding programs could affect the
levels of violence within communities, it will be difficult to establish causation between my
variables rather than just correlation.

Variables
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Independent Variable: Type of Programming
For the independent variable, I am looking at whether or not a case of peacebuilding
programming is interfaith or single-faith. Existing literature provides many definitions of
interfaith programming. Neufeldt (2011, 344) defines it as “engagement between people of
different faith traditions communicating about faith and issues of common concern,” while
Merdjanova and Brodeur (2011, 3) define it as programming that creates “mutual
understanding and cooperation between different people who self-identify religiously.”
Interfaith peacebuilding can occur at different levels, including between religious leaders or
everyday people; it also can be applied to specific groups by age, gender, occupation, etc.
(Merdjanova and Brodeur 2011). Interfaith programming also does not have to revolve
around religious conversations but can address any issues that the participants wish (Smock
2002; Merdjanova and Brodeur 2011; Neufeldt 2011). For this study, I will be looking at
interfaith programming designed with a bottom-up, community-based approach. While the
programming may involve any number of topics or areas of concern and may be run by either
a religious or nonreligious organization, religion should be a major topic within the program.
Lastly, there should be a relatively equal number of people from each faith tradition included
in the programming.
Current literature does not offer a definition of single-faith programming, but Tauriac
et al. defines the similar concept of affinity groups as, “meetings in which participants gather
based on a particular social identity to discuss related personal experiences,” (2013, 246). I
therefore consider single-faith programming to be any that is conducted within the lens of a
single religious tradition for participants who identify as a part of that tradition. I will again
also be looking at bottom-up, community-based programs in which religion is a major topic.
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In order to determine whether programming is single-faith or interfaith, I first looked
at the websites of organizations or groups that ran faith-based peacebuilding programming to
see if the programming was explicitly presented as interfaith or single-faith within the
mission statement or other information on the website. If it was not, I then looked at any
available reports or descriptions of the program, either through organizational reports, news
stories, or scholarly sources, to see whether the setup of the programming would be
considered single-faith or interfaith based on the above listed definitions. For any programs
for which I was still unsure, I then emailed the organization that ran the programming, if I
had been able to obtain their contact information, for further clarification on the type of faithbased peacebuilding they had carried out. I also included the question, “Would you describe
the program as primarily single-faith, interfaith, or some combination of both approaches?”
as the first question in the interview to further confirm the type of programming (Appendix
A). For any programs that used a combination of both approaches, I then asked for further
clarification on which aspects of the programming were primarily single-faith and which
were primarily interfaith. After determining which cases of programming were single-faith
versus interfaith, I used this data along with geographical and temporal information about
programs as the data for the independent variable within the GIS map.

Dependent Variable: Level of Violence
For my dependent variable, I am looking at the levels of violence within a community
facing violent religious conflict. Specifically, I am looking at levels of direct violence, since
direct violence has a more set definition as to what qualifies as violence and is therefore
easier to measure. Direct violence usually refers to physical violence committed by one
group or person against another group or person, though the definition is sometimes
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expanded to include threats of violence, violent language directed at a group or person, and
even destruction of property (Govier 2008; Ferguson, McDaid, and McAuley 2018).
In order to determine how programming affected levels of violence, I utilized the
abovementioned interviews to ask questions about changes in levels of violence, asking
participants “Do you think the programming had an effect on levels of violence within the
community? If so, can you describe the effect?” (Appendix A). I also asked more general
questions such as “How effective do you think the programming was at fostering trust or
reconciliation among participants and within the wider community?” and “Do you think the
programming had lasting effects on the participants and/or the wider community?”
(Appendix A). Even though these last two questions do not directly ask about levels of
violence, they allow participants who might be unsure about levels of violence to talk about
any changes within the community that would likely coincide with changes in levels of
violence.
When available, interviews are also supplemented with reports from the organizations
running the peacebuilding programming to provide more information on the effects and
outcomes of the programming. Such materials may also be used in place of interviews if it is
not possible to interview someone about a certain program. Neither interviews nor program
reports provide a perfect measurement of levels of violence within communities as those
interviewed or the organizations or groups themselves may not have data on or experience
with changing levels of violence. Moreover, both programs and interviewees, especially
those who work for the organization or group running the peacebuilding programming, may
also be motivated to report positive results through reports or interviews. In combination,
however, the use of both interviews and reports on programming work should provide a more
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substantiated and accurate view of the effects of programming on levels of violence within
communities. The inclusion of interviews with program participants, who should have no
organizational motives to report overly positive results, as well as the fact that all information
in the interviews will be confidential unless otherwise requested should further increase the
accuracy of interview responses.
For data mapping, I measured data on direct violence by mapping the geographical
and temporal data of the establishment and operation of faith-based peacebuilding programs
against existing data on conflict deaths in Northern Ireland, which also includes geographical
and temporal data for each conflict death (McKeown 2009). Although this data only includes
data on direct violence in the form of conflict deaths and does not include data on other
forms of direct violence, this still provides a picture of the level of direct violence in
communities, as lower levels of direct violence overall should lead to lower numbers of
conflict deaths.
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Chapter 4: Results and Analysis
In this chapter, I present an overview of the conflict in Northern Ireland before
presenting the results from my geographical data analysis. I then utilize the most similar
systems case study design to present and analyze the data collected from different cases of
faith-based peacebuilding programming.

Case Study: Northern Ireland
The conflict in Northern Ireland, also referred to as the Troubles, was a violent
sectarian conflict lasting from around 1968 to 1998. The conflict was between the Protestant
Unionists, or Loyalists, who wanted Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom
and Catholic Nationalists, or Republicans, who wanted Northern Ireland to be a part of the
Republic of Ireland (McKittrick and McVea 2002; Wallenfeldt 2020). The violence of the
conflict mostly consisted of bombings, sniper attacks, and street fighting and was carried out
primarily by Catholic Nationalist paramilitary groups, such as the Irish Republican Army
(IRA) and Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), Protestant Unionist paramilitary groups,
such as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Ulster Defense Association (UDA), and the
British Army and Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) police force (McKittrick and McVea
2002). Almost 3,400 people were killed within the borders of Northern Ireland, with around
200 more killed in incidents that occurred in other areas of Ireland, the United Kingdom, or
Europe; over 30,000 people were also injured in the violence (Wallenfeldt 2020).
Although the conflict was not strictly religious in nature, rather involving issues such
as nationality, power, and territorial rivalry alongside religion, the strict religious divide
between those on each side of the conflict, and political spectrum in general, meant that it
tended to be experienced as a religious conflict by those living through it (Brewer, Higgins,
37

and Teeney 2011; McKittrick and McVea 2002; Morrow, Birrell, Greer, and O’Keeffe 1991).
Whether or not people choose to recognize the conflict as religious in nature or not, however,
religion has played an extremely significant role in the peacebuilding process, in large part
because of the significant role that religion has always played in the social life of Northern
Ireland (Brewer, Higgins, and Teeney 2011; Morrow et al. 1991). Churches in Northern
Ireland tend to not only be centers of religious life but also community life in general, with
religious organizations representing the oldest and largest sector within Northern Ireland’s
civil society (Brewer, Higgins, and Teeney 2011; Morrow et al. 1991).
The conflict has origins that stretch back to England’s first invasion of Ireland in the
12th century, after which England retained control of Irish affairs and sought to colonize the
island. The most successful colonizing efforts occurred in the 17th century in Ulster, a
province in the north of Ireland (Gallagher and Worrall 1982; McKittrick and McVea 2002;
Wallenfeldt 2020). Although the Irish population was mostly Catholic, the new settlers from
England and Scotland were mostly Protestant, and over time, the new settlers began to
outnumber the native Irish population while rarely assimilating (Gallagher and Worrall 1982;
McKittrick and McVea 2002). Thus, while Ireland as a whole was majority Catholic with a
Protestant minority, Ulster was majority Protestant with a Catholic minority.
After the Irish War of Independence in 1919-1921, in which the Home Rule
movement in the south of Ireland sought self-government from the United Kingdom, the
British Parliament divided Ireland into two self-governing areas through the Government of
Ireland Act (McKittrick and McVea 2002; Wallenfeldt 2020). This created Northern Ireland,
which would have its own parliament while also retaining representation in British
Parliament, and the Irish Free State, which was given its own Home Rule Parliament and
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would later become an independent republic in 1937 (McKittrick and McVea 2002).
Although this created a national and political divide between the two halves of the island, all
churches, both Protestant and Catholic, have remained organized on an all-Ireland basis
(Gallagher and Worrall 1982). Clergy members who are appointed are done so to positions
on both sides of the border irrespective of their own origins, and church conferences are held
often in both Belfast and Dublin (Gallagher and Worrall 1982).
Within Northern Ireland at the time of its formation, around two-thirds of the
population was Protestant and the rest Catholic, and these proportions have remained largely
unchanged since (McKittrick and McVea 2002). Because Protestants had a clear majority in
terms of votes, the new Northern Irish Parliament, referred to as Stormont, was
overwhelmingly Unionist (McKittrick and McVea 2002). Through gerrymandering policies
and a first-past-the-post system, Unionists would remain in uninterrupted and almost
complete power for the next half-century, turning Northern Ireland into essentially a oneparty Protestant Unionist state (McKittrick and McVea 2002; Wallenfeldt 2020).
Although almost all Protestants are politically Unionist, the fact that the Protestant
population is divided between Presbyterianism, Methodism, and the Church of Ireland, as
well as a few smaller denominations, meant that beyond a general shared sense of loyalty to
the United Kingdom, Protestant political and religious beliefs are harder to define (Morrow et
al. 1991). This lack of political unity has been important for Protestantism and Unionism,
especially in terms of finding acceptable solutions in the peace process.
While Methodists and Members of the Church of Ireland have tended to be more
politically moderate, Presbyterians have often been much more conservative (Morrow et al.
1991). This is especially true for members of the Free Presbyterian Church, a sect of
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Presbyterianism started by Rev. Ian Paisley in the 1950s; Ian Paisley and his church members
were known for holding large evangelistic campaigns across Northern Ireland that often
morphed into anti-Ireland, anti-Catholic political protests (Gallagher and Worrall 1982).
Paisley would later become a powerful Unionist politician himself and, for many, represented
the extent to which politics in Northern Ireland were deeply entrenched in religion (Gallagher
and Worrall 1982). In contrast, the structure and hierarchy within the Roman Catholic church
have meant that Catholics across Northern Ireland have tended to receive relatively unified
messaging from the Catholic church and overall share very similar beliefs both religiously
and politically (Morrow et al. 1991).
Under the Stormont government, the Catholic population faced severe economic
discrimination, with job opportunities limited in favor of providing greater opportunity for
the Protestant population; this notably included the civil service and state police force, the
RUC, both of which were over 90% Protestant (McKittrick and McVea 2002). Housing
discrimination against Catholics was also prevalent and resulted in severely segregated
neighborhoods (McKittrick and McVea 2002). Additionally, while almost all Protestant
families sent their children to state schools, almost all Catholic families sent their children to
their local parochial schools, resulting in generations of Catholics and Protestants who did
not interact with one another in their schools, jobs, neighborhoods, or social circles
(Gallagher and Worrall 1982; McKittrick and McVea 2002).
Organized meetings between Catholic and Protestant clergy began in the 1960s,
before the conflict officially began but well into the period of tension that led up to it
(Gallagher and Worrall 1982). The Glenstal and Greenhills Conferences, as they were
known, were mostly an opportunity for religious leaders to meet and discuss theological
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issues rather than political ones. However, the conference proceedings and attendees were
purposefully kept secret from the public to allow for more meaningful discussions about
rising tensions between communities; many attendees later credited these meetings as
important for establishing working relationships between church leaders across communal
lines (Gallagher and Worrall 1982). During this same period, community-based religious
peacebuilding efforts also began to emerge. Even though the conflict had not officially
started, community leaders began sensing tension across the religious divide, and as the data
presented later in this chapter shows, by 1969, five cases of faith-based peacebuilding
programming already existed.
Inspired in large part by the Civil Rights Movement in the U.S., in the late 1960s,
groups of Catholics started to organize in protest of the lack of Catholic representation in
government as well as the Unionist stronghold on power (Gallagher and Worrall 1982;
McKittrick and McVea 2002; Wallenfeldt 2020). Additionally, they demanded antidiscrimination legislation, a more equitable system of housing allocation, and the repeal of
the Special Powers Act, which had provided the state police force power for arrests without
warrants, internment without trial, unlimited search and seizure, and the right to ban meetings
and publications (McKittrick and McVea 2002). Those in the movement also demanded the
enactment of a one man – one vote policy, as traditionally voting had only been permitted to
one person per household; the enactment of such a policy would have provided Catholics
significantly more votes than they had with the current policy at the time (Gallagher and
Worrall 1982; McKittrick and McVea 2002).
Although the Civil Rights marches began as part of a peaceful movement, they
quickly turned violent when, in 1968, the RUC cracked down on a march in
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Derry/Londonderry (McKittrick and McVea 2002; Wallenfeldt 2020). The violence at the
event was caught on television and sparked widespread anger among the Catholic population
(Gallagher and Worrall 1982). With Protestant fears that any concession to Catholic demands
would eventually lead to the reunification of Northern Ireland with the Republic in the south,
where they would then be the minority group, Unionist politicians in Stormont initially
refused to meet most of the demands of the Civil Rights marchers. However, by 1969, unrest
on the streets had become so severe that Stormont eventually conceded to most of the
demands, including the one man – one vote policy, which led to the election of a few
Nationalist politicians, but in the process also splintered the Unionist party between those
willing to concede some of their power and those who were not (McKittrick and McVea
2002).
The concessions were too little too late for many Catholics, however, and violence
only escalated throughout the beginning of the next decade. This resulted in the British
Parliament sending troops into Northern Ireland to restore order (Gallagher and Worrall
1982; McKittrick and McVea 2002). In the first few years of the conflict, Catholics bore the
brunt of violence – a majority of those killed early on were Catholic and around 5% of
Belfast’s Catholic population was permanently displaced – which in large part was due to the
fact that Protestants had both the RUC and British Troops on their side (McKittrick and
McVea 2002). This led to the rebirth of the IRA as a Nationalist paramilitary force.
First formed in the early 20th century to fight for Irish independence, the IRA had
fallen apart after the end of the War of Independence but was brought back by Catholics who
felt the need for a group of their own to fight back against the RUC and British Army
(McKittrick and McVea 2002; Wallenfeldt 2020). In response to the violence by the IRA,
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and later the INLA, Unionist paramilitary groups such as the UVF and UDA also formed
(Wallenfeldt 2020). Internments without trial, especially for Nationalist paramilitaries, was
increased drastically in these same years, eventually escalating to the point that the few
Nationalist members of Stormont withdrew from the assembly until internment was ended
(McKittrick and McVea 2002). This further increased IRA recruitment, as many Catholics
saw the Stormont system as a dead end for political and societal change (McKittrick and
McVea 2002).
1972 marked the most violent year of the conflict, with over 10,000 shootings and
around 2,000 bombings, ultimately leaving 484 people dead (McKittrick and McVea 2002;
Wallenfeldt 2020). Rioting, shootings, and bombings became almost daily events in the
urban areas of Belfast and Derry/Londonderry, leading British soldiers to separate
communities through physical barriers called “peace walls” or “peace lines”, most of which
still remain (Wallenfeldt 2020). With violence spiking and membership to paramilitary
organizations continuing to increase, London again decided to intervene and on March 28th
of that year shut down Stormont and reinstituted direct rule over Northern Ireland, which
would remain in place for the next 25 years (Gallagher and Worrall 1982; McKittrick and
McVea 2002; Wallenfeldt 2020).
Levels of violence began to fall in 1976. One reason for this is that British security
forces began to crack down much more severly on the IRA at the street level, which led
many members of Unionist paramilitary organizations to drop out, as they felt that their
security services were no longer needed (McKittrick and McVea 2002). The IRA also
switched tactics from direct engagement with British troops and Unionist paramilitaries at the
street level to a strategy of sustained terrorism through assassinations and bombings,
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including in places outside the borders of Northern Ireland (Wallenfeldt 2020).
Simultaneously the practice of internment without trial was officially ended, which had been
a large concern of the IRA as well as the general Catholic population (McKittrick and
McVea 2002). However, with the end of internment, those who were imprisoned for having
affiliations with paramilitary organizations were no longer granted a “special category” status
that gave them more freedoms within prisons (Gallagher and Worrall 1982; McKittrick and
McVea 2002).
In protest of this loss, Nationalist prisoners organized a series of hunger strikes in
1980 and 1981 (McKittrick and McVea 2002). These strikes received widespread publicity
and reinvigorated support for the IRA for many everyday Catholics following the strike. In
particular, the strike galvanized widespread support for the IRA’s political wing, the party
Sinn Fein (McKittrick and McVea 2002). In 1982, Sinn Fein received 12% of the total
Northern Irish vote and became the fourth-largest party (McKittrick and McVea 2002).
Importantly, the rise of Sinn Fein provided those who supported strong Republican ideals but
not the violent tactics of the IRA to have a voice in politics (Wallenfeldt 2020).
The 1970s were also an extremely important time for the development of faith-based
peacebuilding efforts in Northern Ireland. Throughout the decade, leaders of all four of the
main churches in Northern Ireland made many statements condemning the violence and
calling on their church members for peace while also becoming more involved in political
talks in Northern Ireland (Gallagher and Worrall 1982). In 1973, the Ballymascanlon
conference was held to provide Catholic and Protestant leaders the opportunity to further
build their cross-community relationships and to brainstorm ways to help end the current
violence, however discussions of the future political situation of Northern Ireland were
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notably absent from the conference discussions (Gallagher and Worrall 1982). During this
same period, many community-level peacebuilding programs were being formed as well,
including youth programs, programs that operated as respite sites away from the conflict, and
neighborhood or inter-church cross-community programs (Gallagher and Worrall 1982).
In 1979, Pope John Paul II planned to visit Northern Ireland while on a visit to the
Republic of Ireland, but recent, large-scale attacks by the IRA combined with protests by
Protestants led to the visit being called off due to security concerns (Gallagher and Worrall
1982). In lieu of a visit, the Pope spoke to a crowd of over 300,000 people in a town just
south of the Northern Irish border where he called directly for those on both sides of the
conflict to lay down their arms and for politicians to work towards reconciliation and a
peaceful end to the conflict (Gallagher and Worrall 1982).
Efforts towards peace continued in the late 1980s, and as the data presented later in
this chapter shows, by 1980 there were 19 cases of faith-based peacebuilding programming.
In 1985, the British and Irish governments formed the Anglo-Irish Agreement, which stated
that the status of Northern Ireland could not be changed towards further alignment with either
government without the consent of the majority of its population (McKittrick and McVea
2002). Talks between members of all governments and paramilitary organizations also were
carried out in a variety of forms and would continue until the end of the conflict (McKittrick
and McVea 2002). In 1993, the Anglo-Irish Agreement was expanded upon in the form of
the Downing Street Declaration. This kept the earlier statement on consent, but added an
explicit acknowledgement that, if the people of Northern Ireland chose to reunite with the
Republic of Ireland, and the people of the Republic of Ireland agreed, the British government
would not stand in their way (McKittrick and McVea 2002). This was seen as a significant
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step for many Nationalists, yet many Unionists remained split on how much they were
willing to agree to.
1994 brought another significant step towards peace when the IRA announced a
ceasefire in August (McKittrick and McVea 2002). When the ceasefire held, the INLA
followed suit and soon so did the Unionist paramilitary groups. As the ceasefire continued
into 1995, The British and Irish governments released a document outlining a shared vision
for the future of Northern Ireland. In it, they envisioned Northern Ireland remaining park of
the U.K. while increasing the strength and number of cross-border institutions between the
Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland (McKittrick and McVea 2002). This document
received the same reception as the Downing Street Declaration but would come to form the
basis of future peace talks (McKittrick and McVea 2002). However, in 1996, the ceasefire
ended suddenly when the IRA carried out a bombing attack in London (McKittrick and
McVea 2002). Subsequently, Sinn Fein was banned from attending any of the official peace
talks until the IRA agreed to another ceasefire (McKittrick and McVea 2002).
On April 10, 1998, a peace agreement was formed between the British and Irish
governments alongside the three main political parties in Northern Ireland, excluding Sinn
Fein (McKittrick and McVea 2002; Wallenfeldt 2020). The Good Friday Agreement, as it
came to be known, was considered to bring an official end to the conflict after 30 years of
sectarian violence. The Good Friday Agreement established a new Belfast Assembly, whose
members would be elected based on proportional representation and would share governing
responsibility with the British Parliament in London, along with a joint executive between a
First Member, who was assumed to always be a Unionist, and a Deputy First Minister, who
was assumed to be Nationalist, thereby ensuring that all agreements had to be made on a
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cross-community basis (McKittrick and McVea 2002). The agreement also formed a new
British-Irish Agreement and British-Irish Council, along with a new Irish North-South
Council, to establish cooperation between Great Britain, the Republic of Ireland, and
Northern Ireland (McKittrick and McVea 2002). Notably, the agreement also stipulated that
all rights provided to Catholics under the agreement would also be afforded to Protestants in
a future united Ireland (McKittrick and McVea 2002).
On May 22nd, referendums were held in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of
Ireland to approve the agreement. The Republic of Ireland supported the agreement by 94%
of the vote and Northern Ireland with 71% (Wallenfeldt 2020). Notably, Catholics in
Northern Ireland were 96% in favor while Protestants were only 52% (Wallenfeldt 2020).
The agreement did not bring an immediate end to violence, as a few large attacks were still
carried out later that year, but violence decreased significantly in the years following, and in
2001, the IRA was the last paramilitary group to officially decommission its weapons
(McKittrick and McVea 2002).
According to the data presented later in this chapter, in 1990, there were 34 cases of
faith-based programming, yet by 1998, that number had risen to 48. Although the agreement
and decommissioning marked the end of the political peace process, the social peace process
has still continued, with new peacebuilding programs being formed and many old ones
remaining in action, as tension and division are still pervasive aspects of Northern Ireland’s
society today.
It is clear that religion played an integral part in the conflict in Northern Ireland.
Faith-based peacebuilding efforts were being carried out since the start of the conflict and
only grew in number as time passed. The next section analyzes geographical data on faith-
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based peacebuilding programming and conflict deaths, in order to see what effects these
peacebuilding efforts might have had on the violence and what relationships exist between
the variables.

Analysis of Geographic Data
As discussed in the previous chapter, I used GIS software to map geographic and
temporal data for peacebuilding programming and conflict deaths in Northern Ireland. The
map shows the change in faith-based peacebuilding programming compared to conflict
deaths over time from 1969-2005. For each year, the map on top shows the change in
peacebuilding organizations across Northern Ireland’s 18 parliamentary constituencies, with
red dots showing the location of cases that only use interfaith programming, purple dots
showing cases that use a combination of both interfaith and single-faith programming, and
teal dots showing cases that use only single-faith programming. The bottom map is a
choropleth map showing conflict deaths across the 18 parliamentary constituencies; the
darker shades of blue represent more conflict deaths, and the number in each constituency
shows the exact number of conflict deaths in that constituency for that year. Parliamentary
constituencies were used as the common unit for geographical comparison as that was the
geographical unit used by McKeown (2009) in the database of conflict deaths. Figure 1
shows a reference map for the location of and names of Northern Ireland’s parliamentary
constituencies, and Figure 2 provides examples of the GIS data map from the years 19701972. See Appendix B for the entire map from 1969-2005.
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Figure 1: Northern Ireland Parliamentary Constituencies

(Queen’s University Belfast n.d.)
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Figure 2: GIS Data Map Examples
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After a dramatic rise in the first four years, from 16 deaths in 1969 to 484 in 1972
(the highest count per year recorded throughout the conflict) the number of conflict deaths
per year slowly trend downward over time, reaching a low in 2004 with zero recorded
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conflict deaths. After the peak in 1972, conflict deaths per year from 1973 to 1976 remained
between 232 and 279. Deaths decreased from 1977 and 1981 to range between 75 and 111
annually and decreased again from 1982 to 1994 to fall between 56 and 99 per year. From
1995 to 2005, yearly conflict deaths decreased even more to remain between 0 and 19
annually, with 1998, the year of the Good Friday Agreement, as an outlier for that decade
with 54 deaths. In total, 3,383 conflict deaths were recorded within the borders of Northern
Ireland.
Table 1: Conflict Deaths per Year

Conflict deaths are also highest in the most populous parliamentary constituencies,
including the constituencies that contain Belfast as well as the constituency of Foyle, which
contains Derry/Londonderry, the second largest city in Northern Ireland. Conflict deaths are
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also higher in the constituencies that border the Republic of Ireland, including Newry &
Armagh and Fermanagh & South Tyrone.

Table 2: Conflict Deaths per Parliamentary Constituency

As the number of conflict deaths decrease over time, the map shows that the number
of cases of faith-based peacebuilding programming increase over time. While there were
only 5 cases of peacebuilding programming in 1969, throughout the time period 62 distinct
programs were operating, with 58 still in operation by 2005 (Table 3 shows all the cases of
faith-based peacebuilding programming included in the map). The majority of the programs
are concentrated in the Belfast area, with a slow spread to other parliamentary constituencies
over time, though Mid Ulster, South Antrim, and Strangford never saw the development of
any peacebuilding programming.
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Table 3: Faith-based Peacebuilding Organizations
Programming Name
174 Trust
Armagh Cathedral Partnership
Ballycastle Church Action
Ballymena Inter-Church Group
Belfast Cathedral's Partnership
Belfast Central Mission
Belfast Christian Family
Belfast Maranatha Community
Castlewellan Together
Christians Together in Newry
Churches Together in Lisburn
City of Belfast YMCA
Clonard Monastery-Fitzoy Presbyterian Fellowship Group
Clonard Reconciliation Project
Coleraine Borough Churches' Forum
Columba Community
Columbanus Community of Reconciliation
Cornerstone Community
Currach Community
Diocese of Down and Dromore Diocesan Bridge Building Programme
Drumcree Faith and Justice Group
East Belfast Mission
Forthspring Inter-Community Group
Holy Cross Benedictine Monastery in Rostrevor
Irish School of Ecumenics "Bridging the Difference" in Enniskillen
Lamb of God Community Northern Belfast
Lurgan Community Bridges Project Youth Programme
New Life City Church Belfast
Newcastle Inter-Church Community Projects Association
Newtownabbey Methodist Mission
North Belfast Interface Network
Omagh Churches Forum
PresenCE Cross Community Group Portaferry
Rathcoole Churches’ Community Group
Sanctus Boscus Reconciliation Group
St Andrew Glencairn
St Brigid's/Fisherwick/St Thomas' and Lisburn Road Methodist Covenant
St Saviour’s Church of Ireland, Craigavon
St. Colmcille's/Gilnahirk Group
St. Matthew’s/St. Oliver Plunkett Group
The Churches Trust
The Churches Trust in Derry/Londonderry
The Junction NI
The Ulster Project Banbridge
The Ulster Project Belfast
The Ulster Project Castlederg
The Ulster Project Coleraine
The Ulster Project Derry/Londonderry
The Ulster Project Enniskillen
The Ulster Project Omagh
The Ulster Project Portadown
West Belfast and Queens University Charismatic Prayer Meetings
Women Together for Peace
YMCA Greenhill
YMCA Larne
YMCA Lisburn
YMCA Lurgan
YMCA North Down
YMCA Portadown
Youth Initiatives East Belfast
Youth Initiatives Lisburn
Youth Initiatives West Belfast

Location
Duncairn Complex, Duncairn Avenue, Belfast, BT14 6BP
The Library, 43 Abbey Street, Armagh, BT61 7DY
60 Ann Street, Ballycastle, BT54 64D
St. Patrick's Rectory, 102 Galgorm Road, Ballymena, Co Antrim, BT42 1AE
Belfast Cathedral, Donegall St, Belfast, BT1 2HB
5 Glengall St, Belfast BT12 5AD
North Belfast
116 Hazelwood Avenue, Cunmurry, BT17 0SZ
5 Cedar Heights, Bryansford, Newcastle, Co Down, BT33 0PJ
33 Dominic St, Newry BT35 8BN
111 Queensway, Lamberg, Lisburn, Co Antrim, BT27 4QS
56—58 Knightsbridge Park, Stranmillis, Belfast, BT9 5EH
77 University Street, Belfast, BT7 1LN
Clonard Monastery, Clonard Gardens, Belfast, Co Antrim, BT13 2RL
C/O The Good Relations Officer, Coleraine Borough Council, Portstewart Road, Coleraine
11 Queen Street, Derry, Co. Derry, BT48 7EG
683 Antrim Road, Belfast BT15 4EG
445 Springfield Road, Belfast, Co Antrim, BT12 7DL
373 Springfield Road, Belfast, BT12 7DG
61–67 Donegall Street, Belfast BT1 2HQ
Drumcree
239 Newtownards Road, Belfast BT4 1AF
373-375 Springfield Road, Belfast, Co Antrim, BT12 7DG
119 Kilbroney Rd, Rostrevor, County Down BT34 3BN
48 Elmwood Avenue, Belfast BT9 6AZ
12 Cliftonville Rd, Belfast, Co. Antrim, BT14 6JX
Lurgan
143 Northumberland St, Belfast BT13 2JF
19 Dundrum Road, Newcastle, Co Down, BT33 0BG
35a Rathcoole Drive, Newtownabbey BT37 9AQ
123 Cliftonville Road BELFAST BT146JR
Community House, 2 Drumragh Avenue, Omagh, BT78 1DP
Ferry Street. Portaferry. Co. Down. BT22 1PB
The Dunanney Centre, Rathmullan Drive, Newtownabbey, Co Antrim, BT37 9DQ
39 Silverstream Crescent, Bangor, Co Down, BT20 3NE
137 Forthriver Road, Belfast, BT13 3SG
42 Derryvolgie Avenue, Belfast, BT9 6FP
Parish of St. Saviour, Drumgor West Road, Craigavon, BT65 4AH
The Parish of St. Colmcille's, 191a Upper Newtownards Road, Belfast, Co Down, BT4 3JB
27-B Glenveagh Dr, Belfast BT11 9HX
121 Spencer Road, Derry/Londonderry, BT47 6AE
65 Kinsale Park, Londonderry, Co Londonderry, BT47 6NW
10-14 Bishop St, Londonderry BT48 6PW
Banbridge
North Belfast
Castlederg
Coleraine
Derry/Londonderry
Enniskillen
Omagh
Portadown
University Rd, Belfast BT7 1NN
2 Rivers Edge, 13-15 Ravenhill Road, Belfast, BT6 8DN
Donard Park, Newcastle, BT33 0GR
34a Pound Street, Larne, BT40 1SD
28 Market Square, Lisburn, BT28 1AG
4 Carnegie Street, Lurgan, Co. Armagh, BT66 6AS
YMCA North Down, 10-12 High Street, BT20 5AY
80 Jervis St, Portadown, Craigavon BT62 3HD
Parkgate Drive, BT4 1EW Belfast
Youth Initiatives Lisburn, Seymore Street, Lisburn, BT27 4XG
50 Colin Road, Belfast, BT17 0LG

Year
1983
1999
2005
1991
1998
pre-1969
1979-1987
1984
1993
1996
1970
pre-1969
1981
1976
1999
1981
1983
1982
1992
1997
1986-1994
1985
1997
1983-1987
1996
1977
2002
1993
1987
pre-1969
2002
1998
2005
1983
2002
1971
1980
1972
1995
1998
1993
1985
2000
1976
1987
1991
1976
1985
1989
1979
1976
1972-1987
1970
pre-1969
1982
1989
1986
1979
pre-1969
2000
2003
1991

Type
Interfaith
Single-faith
Interfaith
interfaith
Interfaith
Single-faith and Interfaith
Interfaith
Single-faith and Interfaith
interfaith
Interfaith
Interfaith
Interfaith
Interfaith
Interfaith
Interfaith
Single-faith and Interfaith
Interfaith
Interfaith
Interfaith
Interfaith
Single-faith and Interfaith
Single-faith and Interfaith
Interfaith
Single-faith and Interfaith
Interfaith
Interfaith
Interfaith
Interfaith
Interfaith
Single-faith and Interfaith
Single-faith and Interfaith
Interfaith
Interfaith
Interfaith
Interfaith
Single-faith
Interfaith
Single-faith
Interfaith
Interfaith
Interfaith
Interfaith
Interfaith
Interfaith
Interfaith
Interfaith
Interfaith
Interfaith
Interfaith
Interfaith
Interfaith
Interfaith
Interfaith
Interfaith
Interfaith
Interfaith
Interfaith
Interfaith
Interfaith
Single-faith and Interfaith
Single-faith and Interfaith
Single-faith and Interfaith

There are also significantly more cases of interfaith peacebuilding programming than
cases that utilize only single-faith programming or both types of programming, yet still more
programming utilizing both forms than single-faith alone. In total, there were 48 cases of
interfaith peacebuilding programming, 11 cases of programming using both forms, and 3
cases of single-faith programming, with interfaith programming as the most popular form in
every single year. Although I originally planned to look mainly at only interfaith and single-
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faith programming, when it became clear that many cases involved the use of both types, I
made a separate “interfaith and single-faith” category in the datasets and map so that I could
also look at the effects of this type of dual-form programming.
From analyzing the maps, several initial conclusions can be drawn. First, there is an
inverse correlation between the number of conflict deaths and the number of cases of
peacebuilding programming. Secondly, interfaith programming is far and above the most
common form of faith-based peacebuilding programming in Northern Ireland. Whether or
not interfaith programming is resulting in decreasing numbers of conflict deaths, people and
organizations must at least believe that it is effective, and specifically more effective than
either of the other two forms of programming, because the number of cases of programming
rises through the conflict. Cases of interfaith programming rise from 3 cases in 1969 to 47 in
2005, compared to an increase from 2 to 8 for programming using both interfaith and singlefaith forms and an increase of 0 to 3 for single-faith programming.
In order to see whether the correlation between the number of conflict deaths and the
number of cases of different forms of faith-based peacebuilding programming was
statistically significant, I ran a fixed effects regression. This regression essentially created a
panel study, which allowed me to look at variables across and within panel units that
themselves do not vary over time. In this case, I employed the 18 parliamentary
constituencies as the panel unites. This means that the model is controlling for differences
across the constituencies when looking at the effects of the independent variable (form of
programming) on the dependent variable (number of conflict deaths). This is useful because
the parliamentary constituencies do have differences that might affect outcomes; for instance,
the four constituencies that encompass Belfast are more densely populated, more urban, and
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as the seat of government, likely more political than any of the other constituencies, which
might result in differences in the independent and dependent variables compared to other
constituencies.
Table 4:
Effects of the Number of Various Forms of Faith-based Peacebuilding Programming on
the Number of Conflict Deaths in Northern Ireland’s Parliamentary Constituencies

This model shows that as the number of cases of interfaith peacebuilding
programming increases, the number of conflict deaths decrease at a statistically significant
level. In contrast, the presence of only single-faith programming is associated with a greater
number of conflict deaths at a statistically significant level. Meanwhile, although the number
of cases of programming that use both interfaith and single-faith approaches appear to be
associated with fewer conflict deaths, the correlation is not statistically significant. Notably,
it would not be significant even at the p < .05 level. I included the year as a control variable
because, as the data and maps showed, deaths decreased over time, so unsurprisingly, the
value is negative and statistically significant. Importantly, the R2 value shows that this model
can account for almost 25% of the change in the dependent variable, or number of deaths.
These results can be associated with two different possible explanations. The first is
that my hypothesis was correct and that an increasing number of cases of interfaith
programming led to a decrease in levels of violence, seen through conflict deaths.
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Alternatively, these results could show the inverse of my hypothesis: as rates of violence and
conflict deaths fall, programs see a window of opportunity to implement interfaith
programming, as the risks and barriers to implementing such program would likely be lower
during periods of less violence. This led me to form an alternate, second hypothesis that as
levels of violence fall, the number of cases of interfaith peacebuilding rise due to lowered
risks. The rest of this chapter will explore both of these hypotheses in more detail by
analyzing different cases of peacebuilding programming through the use of interviews
alongside other primary and secondary sources.

Programming with Both Single-faith and Interfaith Approaches
The Maranatha Community
The Maranatha Community is a Christian prayer organization that focuses on issues
of peace and reconciliation and, over the course of its work, has utilized both single-faith and
interfaith approaches to peacebuilding. According to materials provided by the Maranatha
Community, the Maranatha Community is a “praying Community throughout the United
Kingdom and beyond… bound together by the love of God,” (The Maranatha Community
n.d.). Based originally in Great Britain, the community felt a calling in the 1980s to work
towards peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland, and today the Community has around
10,000 active members, including both Catholics and Protestants (Select Committee on
Northern Ireland Affairs 2001). The Community is strictly non-political and instead focuses
on listening and mutual prayer in order to develop trust and healing between communities
(Select Committee on Northern Ireland Affairs 2001; The Maranatha Community n.d.).
I interviewed the Community Leader of the Maranatha Community who described the
work of the Community in Northern Ireland as follows:
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We were invited to go to Northern Ireland in the early 80s and. At that time,
there was a lot of violence, a lot of trouble, and we were invited because we
were, and still are, a community composed of members of a wide variety of
different churches, so we don't belong to any particular tradition. Our founders
were Catholic and Methodist, so we have a truly cross denominational
foundation, and our community is… committed to praying and working for
unity, renewal and healing. We were founded in 1981 and we started going to
Northern Ireland in around 1984 (Anonymous A 2020).
She also explained that the basis of the Community’s work has always been at the
community level.
We're very much operating at grassroots, so we would go and visit people
who had been the subject of attacks or whose family members had been killed
or we also used to. We would go and visit church leaders who were often
feeling very afraid because of the strength of feeling in their local community.
So, the places that we went were usually the trouble spots (Anonymous A
2020).
Unlike other forms of peacebuilding programming, which might use structured dialogue or
shared community activities to build connections and understanding between people, a
majority of the Maranatha Community’s work is based around prayer, and in particular,
shared prayer.
When we first started going, we didn't go because we had any solutions or
anything like that, as I said, we went on the basis of being alongside people
from all traditions of the church who were experiencing the real effect of the
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Troubles, as they were called, but we also learned a lot. We would describe
ourselves as a listening community, so our posture was one of listening to
people and also because we are a Christian community, we would also be
listening to what God wanted to tell us. We're very much a prayer-based
community, so a lot of what we would do would be to connect with prayer
groups from different traditions to support them, encourage them (Anonymous
A 2020).
Although the Community Leader described the mission and basis of the Maranatha
Community as inter-faith, she also described how, in the earlier years of the conflict before
the IRA ceasefire, the Community actually focused on single-faith work due to the danger
that accompanied interfaith work at the time.
Pre ceasefire, it was actually too dangerous for people from different sides of
the divide. It would be dangerous for them to meet together. If they did, then
they got threats. But what they could do… we set up link so that they knew
that they were praying for each other. And in all of that, we were encouraging
people to believe that actually if Christians united, then there could be a way
to peace (Anonymous A 2020).
Interfaith work was always the goal of the Maranatha Community, however, and the
Community believed that interfaith programming was the most effective form of
peacebuilding. The Community sees interfaith methods as effective by allowing people to
build connections with others and recognize them as fellow human beings, and in the case of
the Maranatha Community’s work, as fellow Christians as well.
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One of the key parts of our work was to help people to recognize that actually
they shared the same faith because the core beliefs were exactly the same. So
the creed, for example, in the Catholic Church is exactly the same as the creed
in the Anglican Church, but they didn't know that because in Northern Ireland
they are born in a certain area, which is either Catholic or Protestant. They
then they go to a Catholic school or a Protestant school. They then go to
Catholic Protestant universities that they are kept separate. And most of the
people said “I had no idea.” So they had no idea about how the other people
were. And when we started introducing people, they were really shocked to
discover that was the problem. There's no difference or, you know, the
differences are not important. So for us, in terms of the single-faith, multifaith,
our very essence is that we are inter-denominational. We are a community
committed to oneness. And we saw that as the key to the resolution of the
conflicts in Northern Ireland (Anonymous A 2020).
When asked about the effects of the Maranatha Community’s work, the Community Leader
said the following:
I think the main effect was that the assurance that [people] were not isolated,
they were not alone, that they had people who cared about them and were
praying for them (Anonymous A 2020).
The power of prayer and the importance of building relationships among people on different
sides of the conflict were also ideas that came up multiple times during the interview. From
the view of the Maranatha Community, prayer can provide the necessary conditions for
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peace. Instead of finding comfort and security within their own in-group, people can find
comfort and security in a higher power through prayer.
If someone was being intimidated or was worried about a family member or
these kinds of things, we would follow up and then provide active support in
terms of phone calls or that kind of thing, also advice. And again, that would
always be prayer based. So, from our perspective, in terms of the lasting
effects we saw, I would say one was building of relationships. And for the
people who are being intimidated, I mean, the idea of intimidation is entirely
control and control always has to induce fear to be effective, so our prayer
would be very much in the context of assuring people that God was with them
so that fear can be minimized and also that they had a means of contact so that
if they needed to talk to someone or if they need a device, then they would
have that link with somebody over here who would have been on that team
(Anonymous A 2020).
The fact that all Christian faiths are rooted in prayer also provides a means of connection for
those from different Christian denominations to connect and relate to one another.
Other lasting effects would be building of relationships over there. So, what
we often used to do would be to link people from different sides – this is from
a Christian perspective – we would link people from different prayer groups
or even different clergy, church leaders, we would make connections, because
it was surprising to us at first that you could have people living within a very
short distance, but they didn't know each other because they were separated by
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this divide. So, building relationships and really building up prayer links
(Anonymous A 2020).
Overall, the Maranatha Community was not able to provide much evidence in support of my
original hypothesis that interfaith programming leads to lower levels of violence within
communities. The Community Leader discussed how Maranatha’s work facilitated
relationship building between people, which is likely associated with reconciliation and
thereby lower levels of direct violence, but the Community was not able to provide any direct
evidence or examples of lowered direct violence.
However, the Maranatha Community does support my alternate hypothesis that as
levels of direct violence decreased over the course of the conflict, windows of opportunities
emerged for interfaith programming. The Community Leader directly stated that, at the start
of their work, the Maranatha Community felt that the risks to participants would be too
severe to conduct interfaith programming at that time. Only after the signing of the Good
Friday Agreement did the Community feel that the environment was safe enough to begin
conducting interfaith programming. Up until that point, the Maranatha Community focused
only on single-faith programming even though the ultimate mission and goal of the
Community was always to involve people in interfaith, face-to-face contact with one another.

Youth Initiatives
Youth Initiatives (YI) is a Christian youth organization focused around fostering
leadership skills and good relations between young people from divided communities.
Founded in 1991 in West Belfast, YI now has opened branches in six different communities
in Northern Ireland and utilizes both single-faith and interfaith forms of peacebuilding

63

programming (Youth Initiatives n.d.). I Interviewed the Good Relations Manager for YI, who
provided more information on the activities of the organization.
She began by explaining more about the origins of the organization, which began
with a cross-community project called Crosslinks in the highly segregated neighborhoods of
West Belfast. This project, which still runs today, is a community youth arts project that
brings together Protestant and Catholic youth to tackle difficult topics through the arts
(Anonymous B 2020). The youth in the project develop their own theatre, music, and dance
performances centered around the experiences of young people in the Troubles which they
then present at public showcases (Anonymous B 2020). Issues of sectarianism have always
been central to these performances, but as new generations of young people have become
involved in the project after the peace process, other issues such as migration and racism
have also begun to be included (Anonymous B 2020).
The Good Relations Manager said that the value of the Crosslinks program is that it
gives young people a safe place to challenge their views outside of their home environment
(Anonymous B 2020). Moreover, she said that using the arts allows young people to have
conversations in a unique and safe way, as young people are often more comfortable having
difficult conversations when it is tied to something they still view as creative and fun, rather
than having to sit down in direct dialogue with people who might have opposing views or
different upbringings (Anonymous B 2020). Crosslinks also allows youth to challenge their
fears of the unknown, as they are able to discover through the program that young people
from different communities still have the same interests and hobbies (Anonymous B 2020).
As the Crosslinks program grew in popularity, YI began offering different programs
for each night of the week so that young people would always have a safe place to go after
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school (Anonymous B 2020). This was in a direct attempt to prevent young people from
becoming involved with different violent street gangs or paramilitary groups (Anonymous B
2020). The Good Relations Manager explained that it was within these afterschool programs
that YI also began offering more traditional faith-based peacebuilding programs such as
dialogue groups and Bible study groups (Anonymous B 2020).
It is in these groups that YI uses both single-faith and interfaith programming. Singlefaith programming is used for the younger groups, with members ages 11 to 14, while
interfaith programming is used with the 15 to 18-year-olds (Anonymous B 2020). The Good
Relations Manager explained that, although YI believes that interfaith approaches are
important for building cross-community bonds between young people, the younger members
of these groups are not yet mature enough to engage in serious dialogue with members of a
different community (Anonymous B 2020). A large focus within the single-identity groups is
having these 11 to 14-year-olds explore their own views and identities in order to give them a
chance to challenge their own beliefs before possibly trying to challenge others’ (Anonymous
B 2020). These younger members also spend time learning how to express themselves and
their views in productive rather than defensive ways so that they are better prepared to
engage in interfaith discussions in the future (Anonymous B 2020).
Within the older groups, the Good Relations Manager explained that they always
spend time allowing the young people to form friendships with one another through playing
games or working together on art or community projects before actually engaging in any
serious discussion (Anonymous B 2020). Once friendships are formed between the group
members, it becomes significantly harder for the young people to disregard their peers as
“others” and then ignore or criticize their beliefs completely (Anonymous B 2020). Within
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the interfaith groups, staff members also focus on helping the group members develop the
confidence and skills needed to engage in productive dialogue with others so that they can
continue to challenge attitudes and beliefs even when they go back to their own communities
at home (Anonymous B 2020). After a few years of involvement with the interfaith groups,
older members are also given the chance to meet with the younger, single-faith groups and
present their experiences and what they have learned (Anonymous B 2020).
The Good Relations Manager also mentioned that, although most families are
supportive of their children attending the single-identity groups, many parents do bring up
safety concerns in relation to their children attending the interfaith groups, especially if it
involves their children travelling to a YI center in a different neighborhood (Anonymous B
2020). She went on to explain that YI staff members often engage in home visits to
concerned families and that, after discussing the safety and benefits of the program, most all
of the families become willing to allow their children to join (Anonymous B 2020).
When I asked about the effects of the program, the Good Relations Manager
explained that one of the most significant effects is that involvement with YI allows young
people to visit different parts of their own city and meet new people that they otherwise
would never have, especially since YI centers are deliberately located in highly segregated
areas (Anonymous B 2020). Because many young people stay involved with YI for a
significant part of their later school years, staff members are also able to see that many of the
young people form long-lasting friendships across community lines (Anonymous B 2020).
Staff members also see that many of the people who meet within YI programming also tend
to start socializing outside of the project, getting to know one another’s friends and wider
social circles, which then creates wider networks of friendships between Catholic and
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Protestant young people (Anonymous B 2020). She noted that quite a few past participants
are also in mixed marriages with people from the opposite religion, which creates generations
of change through mixed families (Anonymous B 2020).
For further information on YI’s programming and effectiveness, the Good Relations
Manager directed me to several video interviews that YI’s branch in Scotland recorded with
YI Northern Ireland staff members who had also participated in YI programs when they were
younger. An Interview with staff member Lynda Whinnery provided further insights into
YI’s work.
When the interviewer asked Lynda about her experience with YI and why she chose
to keep working with the program, she said the following:
The highlight of all of my time at Youth Initiatives has been the Crosslinks
and the other performances written and performed. It came down to the people
and it came down to having a space where I discovered friendships that were
new and to interesting people who thought differently from me and whose
stories were different, yet they were really willing to embrace me and to let
me really embrace them and for us to become really part of each other’s lives.
And it felt something different. It felt like we were doing something that other
people aren’t doing really and they’re really missing out. And so, I think it
really kind of captured my heart for the good relations cross community side
of things even at that young age of like 15-16 (Youth Initiatives Scotland
2020).
Lynda also spoke about what it was like to meet young people from other communities in
Belfast.
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Because the city was so segregated, it wasn’t easy to meet people from the
other community and because I wasn’t driving myself and I couldn’t take
myself places and at the time when we were younger still – you wouldn’t have
gone in by yourself at the time. So, it wasn’t really until Crosslinks and Youth
Initiatives that I met people knowing that they were Catholic I suppose… and
recognizing that we’ve been brought up quite differently here. My faith has
always been very important to me, and I became a Christian very young, and I
never struggled with my faith, you know it was always something I really held
on to. And then meeting some of the guys then from West and just seeing how
they’re faithful… I had never seen a Catholic mass; I’d never seen a Eucharist
being celebrated. On that first day that we did the drama in the city center I
actually met my husband, because he was Adam in the play that day, and
although we didn’t get together for years and years it was the start of a really
good friendship… And as we were talking and becoming more friends and
engaging in the kind of cross community good relations discussions as part of
Crosslinks there were all these little things coming out like “oh no I never
knew that” … there were all these things you’d never have thought of until
you had the conversation (Youth Initiatives Scotland 2020).
In the interview, Lynda talked about how connecting with others across religious and
community lines was one of the most profound parts of the program. She spoke about the
first time she seriously engaged in dialogue with her peers from the Catholic community
about their experiences in the Troubles and how that experience helped her to build deeper
connections with those people.
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[The dialogue] kind of got under the surface and it took us to a different level
of friendship because we were actually being vulnerable, and we were sharing
a lot. It was a lot of legacy of the past in terms of what they experienced
during the Troubles. So that would be one of the kinds of things that kind of
launched us into a different kind of friendship (Youth Initiatives Scotland
2020).
YI did not directly have information on the effects of their programming on levels of
violence within communities, however, both the Good Relations Manager and Lynda
Whinnery discussed the impact that YI’s programming had on relationships between
Catholic and Protestant young people. YI staff members find that participants in YI
programming do form strong bonds across community and religious lines not only
with their fellow participants in YI but also with each other’s wider community
networks and circle of friends. Although the YI staff members did not directly
mention levels of violence or reconciliation, the success in relationship building is
likely associated with Catholic and Protestant youth humanizing and trusting one
another, as well as one another’s communities which is then likely to result in lower
levels of direct violence within their communities.
In terms of YI’s decision to use interfaith versus single-faith programming, YI
has always used some interfaith programming from the beginning. The organization
began with the Crosslinks program, which brings together Catholic and Protestant
youth, but this program focused more on building relationships through shared
activities in the arts rather than serious interfaith dialogue. When YI began to
implement dialogue-based programming, they decided to also utilize a combination
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of both single-faith and interfaith approaches in order to reduces risks faced by
participants. YI did not see these risks as externally related, such as to levels of
violence in communities, but rather internally related to the participants themselves.
Younger participants needed to first learn how to properly engage in meaningful,
respectful dialogue within a group of similar peers before engaging across the
religious divide.

Conclusions on Programming with Both Single-faith and Interfaith Approaches
Neither the Maranatha Community nor YI were able to provide conclusive evidence
that their programming resulted in changes in the levels of direct violence within
communities. Both emphasized the effects of their programming on allowing participants to
humanize one another and build relationships across religious lines, with YI also
emphasizing the wider community effects of their programming. This is likely associated
with greater feedings of trust and reconciliation among participants, which likely would lead
to lower levels of violence, but neither organization was able to say for sure whether their
work had any effect on levels of violence.
On the other hand, both organizations emphasized that interfaith peacebuilding was
always the ultimate goal of their programming, but they used single-faith programming to
minimize any risks they associated with interfaith programming. For the Maranatha
Community, this meant using single-faith peacebuilding up until the Good Friday Agreement
led to a safer environment overall in Northern Ireland, while YI was less focused on the
external environment in participants’ communities and instead on the ability of participants
themselves to appropriately engage in interfaith dialogue. This has led YI to use single-faith
programming for younger participants as a stepping-stone to interfaith programming later on.
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Therefore, although the Maranatha Community supports the hypothesis that as levels of
violence fall throughout the conflict, interfaith peacebuilding is seen as a more viable option,
YI does not support this hypothesis, as interfaith peacebuilding is not dependent on the stages
of the conflict but rather the stages of life of the participants themselves. In both cases,
however, single-faith peacebuilding on its own is not seen as enough and is instead only used
to prepare participants for future interfaith programming or for when interfaith programming
is not seen as an option.

Single-faith Programming
Evangelical Contribution on Northern Ireland
The Evangelical Contribution on Northern Ireland (ECONI) was formed in 1985 in
opposition of the form of conservative evangelical politics spread by Rev. Ian Paisley
through the Free Presbyterian church (Ganiel 2008a; Ganiel 2014). From its founding,
ECONI was a single-faith Evangelical Protestant organization. ECONI’s work focused on
challenging evangelical political beliefs from an evangelical perspective in order to prepare
them to engage with Catholics, and even with more liberal Protestants, within a shared
society (Ganiel 2014; Power 2011a). The mission of ECONI is to “address our fellow
evangelicals in order to encourage a continuing process of relating the Bible to our confused
situation,” (Power 2011a, 59).
With Paisleyism, Evangelical Protestantism and Unionism became intertwined to the
point that many evangelicals associated Unionism with Godliness, which often led to
distancing from, or hostility towards, others in order to prevent being associated with or
influenced by “Godless” elements or ideas (Brewer, Higgins, and Teeney 2011; Power
2011a). ECONI saw this phenomenon as one that would inevitably make peace and
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reconciliation extremely difficult since it often prevented any peaceful relationships from
being created between evangelicals and others (Brewer, Higgins, and Teeney 2011; Power
2011a). At the same time, ECONI believes that it is important for evangelicals to engage in
self-reflection and repentance for their own roles in any violence before attempting to engage
across community lines (Ganiel 2014; Power 2011a).
ECONI felt that many evangelicals had to first be convinced that peace was even
valuable before they could begin any true peace and reconciliation work within the
community (Power 2011a). Because Protestants had come from a point of societal and
political privilege within Northern Ireland, ECONI recognized that many Protestants were
unwilling to make any concessions to the Catholic community, which made peace deals
difficult to create (Power 2011a). As part of their programming, ECONI focused on
exploring different forms of Christianity to help evangelicals see possibilities for common
ground with other communities (Power 2011a). The organization also worked to teach
participants about the benefits of an open, peaceful society for all and to prepare evangelicals
with the proper tools so that they would be able to engage in dialogue about peace and
reconciliation (Ganiel 2014; Power 2011a).
Because ECONI was founded and run by evangelicals, the organization was able to
utilize evangelical symbols, terminology, and arguments to promote peace and inclusion
rather than hostility and separation (Brewer, Higgins, and Teeney 2011). The organization
taught what they considered to be a more Biblical perspective on peace and reconciliation,
including the idea that exclusion, apathy, and/or hostility are not Biblical solutions to
interacting with others (Brewer, Higgins, and Teeney 2011; Power 2011a). Through teaching
a reexamination of the Bible, it argued that evangelicals needed to be active peacemakers
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who were willing to cross societal boundaries, as was demonstrated often in the Bible
through the healing work of Jesus Christ (Power 2011a). ECONI especially targeted those
people and congregations who were the most conservatively anti-ecumenist, anti-cross
community work (Brewer, Higgins, and Teeney 2011). With this focus, ECONI believed that
even if they could not convince people of the benefits of ecumenism, they could at least
transform a person’s views to become anti-violence/pro-peace (Brewer, Higgins, and Teeney
2011).
David Porter, the director of ECONI described ECONI’s mission and programming
as follows:
[ECONI] didn’t say you can’t be a Unionist and an Evangelical Christian.
What it did say was that God is neutral on the constitutional future of
Northern Ireland, that defending Ulster is not defending the gospel, no more
than Uniting Ireland is bringing about the reconciliation of the gospel, loving
our enemy, making peace, living peace with all people as far as possible is
within us. It was basically in the first instance a call to our own community to
live up to that. If that is what Christian discipleship is about then live for God
and his glory alone in this community and that means forgiveness, it means
love of enemy, it means commitment to being a peace maker, it means
commitment to working for justice in society, it means repentance for how we
have all screwed up and hated each other (Brewer, Higgins, and Teeney 2011,
140).
ECONI’s main programming began with a program called ECONI Sundays, where ECONI
distributed materials to evangelical congregations that provided guidelines to sermons and
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discussions, with each Sunday focused on a specific theme, such as peace, justice, or
reconciliation (Power 2011a). Prayer was also a central part of each ECONI Sunday, as
ECONI believed that prayer would allow evangelicals the opportunity to self-reflect and ask
for forgiveness in a way in which they felt comfortable (Power 2011a). Additionally, since
prayer is an important aspect of all Christian traditions, it would also provide a starting place
to discuss the similarities and differences between evangelicals and other Christians (Power
2011a). As congregations worked their way through ECONI Sunday programming, the
themes also became more political, covering topics such as policing and weapons
decommissioning (Power 2011a). ECONI felt strongly that once members of evangelical
congregations began to understand these issues and become comfortable discussion them
among themselves, they would be better prepared to discuss them with others in the future
(Power 2011a).
In order to reach people outside of the congregations that were directly connected
with ECONI, the organization also held a variety of public events, such as political forums,
where Unionist politicians would be invited to engage in conversation with ECONI
members, as well as members of the audience, on issues ranging from education to
paramilitarism (Power 2011a). ECONI also hosted an annual conference, summer school for
children and youth, and religious education programs for adults called the Programme for
Christian Peacebuilding (Ganiel 2008a) By 1998, more than one-third of all Protestant
congregations in Northern Ireland had participated in some form of ECONI programming
(Ganiel 2008a).
ECONI’s ultimate goal as an organization is essentially to no longer be needed at all
because Evangelical Protestants would become willing and able to engage in peace and
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reconciliation work with Catholics without ECONI’s assistance. As one ECONI staff
member said:
ECONI is on the fringes of the church to pester and stir up the church, that’s
our task. And the ultimate aim of ECONI is to do itself out of a job… There’s
a sense in which we really should not exist because the emphasis that we
bring, the particular aspect of the gospel that we seek to apply to sectarianism
and divided society, should be at the heart of every church’s ministry. We
want to argue that this is not a kind of fuzzy, ecumenical, left-wing add-on.
That the things that we are emphasizing are absolutely central to the things
that make for peace (Ganiel 2008b, 487).
ECONI does not provide any information on the effects of their programming on
levels of direct violence within communities. Additionally, while the Maranatha
Community and YI discussed the effects of their programming on participants’
abilities to humanize and build relationships with others, which are likely associated
with greater trust and reconciliation, ECONI’s focus is mainly on self-reflection and
repentance.
ECONI does view its work as a stepping-stone to future interfaith
programming but does not believe that evangelicals have reached a point yet where
they are willing or able to properly engage in dialogue or meaningful contact across
religious lines. As evangelicals engage in more self-reflection, repentance, and
education, however, ECONI believes that eventually they will be prepared to engage
in interfaith programming. Thus, ECONI does generally support my second
hypothesis that interfaith programming increases over time as windows of
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opportunity emerge for safer contact between groups. From ECONI’s point of view,
that window of opportunity has not yet emerged, but they are preparing evangelicals
to be ready for interfaith contact when it does.

Evangelical Alliance Northern Ireland
Evangelical Alliance (EA) is a large Protestant volunteer organization based out of
the U.K. The Northern Ireland branch emerged in the early 1980s from a small Presbyterian
volunteer group working towards peace and reconciliation that eventually became affiliated
with the wider EA network (Ganiel 2008a; Ganiel 2008b). EA in Northern Ireland combines
political lobbying with grassroots community programming to advance an Evangelical
Presbyterian agenda separate from the politics and beliefs of the Free Presbyterian Church
and Rev. Ian Paisley (Ganiel 2008b).
While Paisleyism is associated with a rejection of power-sharing and compromise by
Protestant Unionists, EA works to promote evangelical beliefs that are pro-peace and prosocial justice for all in Northern Ireland (Ganiel 2008b). EA criticized the failure of many
evangelical churches to embrace the idea of a Northern Irish society where Catholics and
Protestants could coexist peacefully and for failing to adequately dissuade their church
member for committing acts of violence (Ganiel 2008b). To promote change within the
Evangelical Presbyterian community, EA developed materials that called on evangelicals to
closely examine their own beliefs to determine whether or not they actually matched with
Jesus’ teachings and Biblical ideals of peace, loving one’s neighbor, helping those in need,
and so on (Ganiel 2008b).
One EA volunteer described the effects of EA’s programming on their views towards
people of other faiths as well as their personal understanding of Christianity as follows:
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I suppose Evangelical Alliance was one of the first organizations that I would
have become involved in as a young minister and that would have been one of
the things that opened my eyes to what I now regard as being a much more
Biblical perspective of what Christianity is about. EA were involved with
another organization called ECONI in the late 80s, early 90s and they were
having a fresh look at what it actually means to be a citizen of the kingdom of
God. And not to be a Christian whose political views are tempered by a
particular understanding of Scripture. EA and ECONI gave me theological
depth and also broke down some of the barriers that I would have erected
between other Christians in other denominations and gave me an
understanding that the body of Christ was broader than what I had anticipated
it being (Ganiel 2008b, 487).
To engage with evangelical communities, EA leads community worship activities, such as
prayer breakfasts, and religious education seminars, which explore topics such as the shared
Christian heritage of Catholics and Protestants or the Biblical underpinnings of evangelical
beliefs (Evangelical Alliance n.d.; Ganiel 2008a). EA also leads citizenship education
programs that include conversations on the role of religion in politics and encourage people
within the member churches to vote (Ganiel 2008a). Additionally, EA leads groups that
volunteer to provide social services in disadvantaged communities, and throughout Northern
Ireland almost 40 congregations and 70 volunteer groups are connected with EA (Ganiel
2008a).
Part of EA encouraging people to be more involved in their communities and even in
politics was to encourage people not to accept the status quo of division in Northern Ireland
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and to distance from the prevalent evangelical belief that evangelicals should separate
themselves from society in order to maintain their faith (Ganiel 2008a). EA wants its
members to see politics as a non-zero-sum game, where evangelicals could still maintain
their personal beliefs while working towards a more equal and peaceful society for everyone
in Northern Ireland (Evangelical Alliance n.d.; Ganiel 2008a). EA believes that churches had
failed to adequately serve their congregations, which had resulted in fear among evangelicals
that compromising with the Catholic population would result in losses for the Protestant
community; EA strives to provide a new, peaceful vision of what community wellbeing
among evangelicals could be (Evangelical Alliance n.d.). EA believes that if a more open and
justice-oriented mindset could be developed within the evangelical community, new
generations of evangelicals could work together with more liberal Protestants and Catholics
to create mutual understanding and ultimately reconciliation and forgiveness (Evangelical
Alliance n.d.).
EA did not have information available on the effects of their work on levels of direct
violence in communities. EA’s work is focused mainly on self-reflection, religious education,
and political education within the evangelical community rather than focusing on building
trust and reconciliation between religious communities. EA does condemn violence
committed by evangelicals, however, and encourages evangelicals to think critically about
their own roles in committing acts of violence or turning a blind eye toward such acts.
Although encouraging evangelicals to interact and reconcile with other communities is the
ultimate goal, EA is still in the process of working with evangelicals to create more a more
open-minded, pro-peace mentality within the community before attempting to conduct work
across religious lines.
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Conclusions on Single-faith Programming
Neither ECONI nor EA were able to provide information on the effectiveness of their
programming on reducing levels of violence, nor does either program focus specifically on
relationship building, trust, or reconciliation directly; rather, these are goals that both
organizations hope to work towards over time. Instead, both ECONI and EA focus heavily on
self-reflection and education for members of the evangelical community specifically. Both
organizations do also condemn apathy, hostility, exclusion, and violence by members of their
communities as part of their work on self-reflection and repentance. Although this work
could still have an effect on levels of violence, the effect is not known.
In relation to whether interfaith peacebuilding becomes a more popular form of
peacebuilding over time as it becomes safer and more acceptable, both organizations do seem
to support this hypothesis. For ECONI and EA, both organizations strive to build the capacity
within evangelical communities for interfaith programming, whether eventually facilitated by
these organizations themselves or conducted without the support of these organizations.
However, neither ECONI nor EA feels that the evangelical community is currently prepared
to engage productively with interfaith peacebuilding programming across religious lines as
there is not enough understanding within the evangelical community on the benefits of peace,
social justice, and/or cross-community work. Both organizations believe that interfaith
programming should be the ultimate goal within faith-based peacebuilding but are waiting
for the window of opportunity to appear within the evangelical community.

Interfaith Programming
The Ulster Project
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The Ulster Project is an interfaith youth peacebuilding program founded in 1975 that
takes youth from divided communities to participate in integrated exchange programs in the
United States (The Ulster Project n.d.). The mission of the Ulster Project is explicitly
religious and peacebuilding-focused, with the mission statement of the program reading:
“Transforming Young Christians Into Leaders & Peacemakers” (The Ulster Project n.d.). The
Project focuses on involving young people ages 14 to 16 from divided communities who
have shown leadership potential (McInerney-Starr 2015). The young people are put into
groups, each with an equal number of Catholics and Protestants, and are sent on summer
exchange programs to cities across the U.S., where they are each paired with an American
student of the same religion, gender, and age (Faith in Friendship 2017; McInerney-Starr
2015). After starting with one program in Delaware, the Ulster Project has now expanded to
send Northern Irish young people to 19 cities across the U.S. (The Ulster Project n.d.).
While in the U.S., the groups engage in “Time of Discovery” where they sit in
dialogue with one another and discuss issues that are important to members of each
community, such as sectarianism, violence, racism, and immigration (McInerney-Starr 2015;
The Ulster Project n.d.). Participants are encouraged throughout the program to think
critically about their own beliefs and prejudices, as well as what it means to overcome
prejudice, with the goal to encourage tolerance, trust, forgiveness, and friendship among
participants that will persist even after they return to their home communities (Leonard,
Yung, and Cairns 2015; McInerney-Starr 2015). Participants also examine tough issues such
as what it would mean to be a member of a paramilitary group or what it would mean to
engage in violence (McInerney-Starr 2015). Outside of the dialogue activities, the
participants also participate in different teambuilding activities, service projects, and social
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events together (McInerney-Starr 2015). These more lighthearted events give the participants
the opportunity to form friendships with one another, which can also make the dialogue
activities more comfortable for them (McInerney-Starr 2015). Additionally, each Sunday the
participants attend a different church service in order to explore the similarities and
differences between various Christian denominations (Faith in Friendship 2017; McInerneyStarr 2015).
The Ulster Project specifically believes that there is value in sending young people
from Northern Ireland to the United States because it allows the Northern Irish young people
the opportunity to completely leave their communities, escaping both sectarian violence and
the opinions of their fellow peers, families, and community members, so that they can
explore their own beliefs in a safe and open space (McInerney-Starr 2015). When the project
first began, program leaders felt that the situation in Northern Ireland was not safe enough to
involve young people in interfaith work within their own communities, so sending young
people to the U.S. was a way for the program to still conduct the interfaith work they felt was
crucial but in an environment that was safe for young people (Town Square Delaware 2018).
In an interview with a Delaware newspaper, Ulster Project leader Amanda Finn talked about
how the safety situation has changed over time.
When [The Ulster Project] first began, the group traveling to Delaware from
Portadown, Northern Ireland, had to leave in the middle of the night because
the families didn’t want their neighbors to know that their children were
participating in a cross-community project for fear that they might be targeted
by those who didn’t agree with the mission of such programs. All of the
planning meetings prior to their trip were held at the town hospital as it was
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the only neutral space; a Catholic would never set foot in a Protestant church
or in the home of a Protestant and vice versa. Now, our Northern Irish
participants return home proudly wearing their [Ulster Project] hoodies (Town
Square Delaware 2018).
Additionally, because sectarianism between Catholics and Protestants is not an issue that
American youth experience, the program believes that the Northern Irish students can learn
from their American counterparts how to peacefully coexist and build friendships across
denominational lines (Faith in Friendship 2017; McInerney-Starr 2015).
The Ulster Project believes in an interfaith approach, because they recognize that
most young people in Northern Ireland do not have the opportunity to interact with others
from different communities (McInerney-Starr 2015; The Ulster Project n.d.). This constant
division makes it easy for negative stereotypes and attitudes to exist between Catholics and
Protestants. For many participants, the Ulster Project is the first time they have even
interacted with someone from a different religious community, and for the majority of
participants, is the first time that they have formed friendships across community lines
(McInerney-Starr 2015; Town Square Delaware 2018; The Ulster Project n.d.). Ulster Project
leader Amanda Finn explained how the program is able to tell that the participants have made
lasting friendships.
We maintain strong ties with our past [Ulster Project] teens and their families
both here and in Northern Ireland. We have a very active Facebook group
which allows past participants to follow the journey each summer and to keep
in touch with each other. Many past participants stay involved by serving on
the board, being a leader, sponsoring an event for the teens during the summer
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program, or hosting a leader. We also have a lot of second-generation
participants, both American and Northern Irish (Town Square Delaware
2018).
A survey of Ulster Project participants also found that participants in the program had
significantly more out-group contact and friendships compared to non-participants (Leonard,
Yung, and Cairns 2015). Specifically, they reported having more friends from other
communities and reported visiting other communities more often than non-participants
(Leonard, Yung, and Cairns 2015). The parents of Ulster Project participants have also
reported that, after participation in the Ulster Project, their children seemed more openminded about diversity, more tolerant of those of other faiths, and had new friendships with
peers of other faiths (McInerney-Starr 2015). The Ulster Project also works with clergy in
Northern Ireland to become involved with the program so that they can support the Northern
Irish youth in their new spiritual journeys upon their return home (McInerney-Starr 2015).
Notably, based on surveys from past participants, the Ulster Project also claims that no Ulster
Project alum has joined any paramilitary organization (McInerney-Starr 2015).
In a documentary provided by the Ulster Project, former participants talk about their
experience in the program. Participant Aislinn Hoy talked about how the program allowed
her to form friendships across religious divides.
It really upset me on how separate [Catholics and Protestants] are because
there’s this one girl who did the project with me and she lives right next door
to me, and I did not know she existed until we both got on the Project because
she’s Protestant and I’m Catholic… and we meet up a lot… we’re best friends
(Faith in Friendship 2017).
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Another former participant, Jake McCrae, talked about the impact the dialogue
activities had on him and how that led to him building connections to others in the
opposite community.
The “Time of Discovery” was kind of a surprise to me, and it was probably
actually my favorite part of it because we were discussing things like
sectarianism – very much a very key issue in where we live – but we never get
to discuss it… you really learn a lot and you meet a lot of people, and when
you come back it’s just this whole new world has kind of opened up with all
these people you can now meet – friends of friends, and it’s really opened up
after that (Faith in Friendship 2017).
Ulster Project staff member and former participant James McLoughlin discussed the impact
that program on him personally as well as on the participants he leads now.
When I came back in 2012, I always promised myself that I’d become a leader
again and when I was first able to it’s really made me want to strive and work
towards there being better community relations in Northern Ireland and to
provide teenagers with opportunities to socially interact and get to know each
other on a cross-community basis. The Ulster Project teenagers are bringing
their peers into their friendship group that they formed on the project and
therefore there’s a loads more cross-community contacts being formed which
is cool to see (Faith in Friendship 2017).
Ulster Project leader Fr. John Forsythe also stressed the effects of the Ulster Project not just
on participants but on whole communities within Northern Ireland.
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I have seen hundreds and hundreds of young people totally changed by what
the Ulster Project has does for them. It’s not just 62 teenagers making friends
with each other. It’s those 62 teenagers, and each of those has a wider
family… so thousands of people can be affected by the Ulster project… One a
week they have a very serious retreat lasting three or four hours where they
face into issues like sectarianism in Northern Ireland but racism in America as
well, and really put into action that we are all God’s children… and
dismantling prejudice wherever they find it (Faith in Friendship 2017).
The Lord Mayor of Belfast from 2012-2013, Gavin Robinson, was an Ulster Project alum.
Shortly after his term as mayor, Belfast faced a crisis when the city council voted to limit the
number of days the British Union Flag could fly above city hall, which led to widespread
protests, attacks on homes, and death threats to city leaders. When interviewed about the
impact of the Ulster Project on his leadership as mayor, Robinson framed the impact through
his response to the flag crisis.
Growing up, I didn’t get the opportunity to mix. Even at a young age at 15 or
16 it’s hugely important. If I hadn’t had the opportunity to challenge myself
and to have in a safe context, as well the opportunity for others to challenge
me, I wouldn’t have smashed some of the myths that were in my head, the
perceptions that I had that weren’t only negative but potentially, over the
course of decades growing up in my formative years, destructive. When we
were in Milwaukee, we just realized how some of the issues that might be
prevalent in Northern Ireland just didn’t exist at all. So, for somebody from
my background… going to a Catholic church is not the done thing… And I
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guess that was incredibly helpful in the path towards politics. I wanted to
make sure I was not only doing the right thing as a civic leader, but I wanted
to be seen to go the extra mile. I wanted to engage with people where
ordinarily the people of Belfast would have expected me to have found an
excuse to be doing something else… One thing I wanted to make sure,
particularly in the issue of the flag, and particularly because I come from…
quite a hardline Unionist area, where it would have been easy for me to talk
from that perspective… I refrained from doing so. I thought it was very much
my role to stand up for the city as a whole… and so that meant that my job
was to one, work to bring about an end to the difficulties we had on the
streets, but two, to galvanize the large silent majority within the city who felt
that what was happening on the streets was not reflective of them (Faith in
Friendship 2017).
In relation to my first hypothesis, the Ulster Project does support the idea that their
programming has resulted in lower levels of violence through the claim that no Ulster
Project participant has joined a paramilitary organization after their participation on
the program. Besides this direct example, the Ulster Project also focuses specifically
on forming trust, forgiveness, reconciliation, and lasting relationships between
participants as well as participants’ wider communities; participants, their families,
and community members also support this claim, citing changes in the participants’
attitudes and beliefs upon their return from the program. This is likely related to a
reduction in violence as well, as participants learn to humanize one another and their
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communities, but conclusive data on the effectiveness of the program on levels of
violence is not available.
In terms of my second hypothesis, that over time as conflict deaths fall, the
risks to interfaith peacebuilding programming also fall and windows of opportunity
emerge for its implementation, the Ulster Project does generally support this idea.
The Ulster Project acknowledges that there were significant risks to participation in
its programming at the time of its founding, but as time has passed and the direct
violence associated with the conflict has lessened, and the Ulster Project has become
more well-known and understood within communities, safety risks for participants
have fallen. Additionally, because the Ulster Project was committed to interfaith
programming from the start, they chose to still implement such programming but
managed to reduce risks by conducting their programming primarily in safe, neutral
spaces abroad in the U.S.

New Life City Church Belfast
New Life City Church is a nondenominational Christian church, founded in Belfast in
1993 (Hope Builders International n.d.; New Life City Church n.d.). The church is uniquely
situated on a peace line, or dividing wall, between the two most divided communities in
Belfast: the Shankill Road community, which is almost 100% Protestant, and the Falls Road
community, which is almost 100% Catholic (Hope Builders International n.d.; New Life City
Church n.d.). These two communities are divided by tall peace walls, but the church is
located in a building set into the middle of the wall, with half of the building in each
community (Hope Builders International n.d.).
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The church ministers to both Catholics and Protestants, and members from both
communities regularly attend the services at the church (Hope Builders International n.d.).
Along with regular church services, City Church also runs a community sports club, a coffee
shop, and provides space for community events (Hurd 2019). These programs all aim to
connect people from both the Shankill and Falls Road communities who would otherwise
likely not meet or interact (Hurd 2019). The two communities faced some of the most severe
violence during the Troubles and were known for having a strong paramilitary presence;
because of this, many of City Church’s members are former paramilitaries (Hope Builders
International n.d.; Hurd 2019). In a news interview, Senior Pastor Jack McKee said the
following:
Among those that come into our church regularly Sunday after Sunday are
those who are from terrorist backgrounds who at one time would have wanted
to have killed each other… there was a time when I would have killed some of
them. I was a soldier. And I just get amazed when I see people coming to faith
in Jesus at any time, but knowing they come from a terrorist background and
that they’re able to come and sit in the same row from those who were on the
opposite side and worship God alongside them, only God could have done
that (Hurd 2019).
A church member and former Protestant Unionist paramilitary had the same sentiment.
I have Catholic friends now, Catholic friends who, many years ago, I would
have tried to kill (Hurd 2019).
Alongside the regular church services and community programs, New Life City Church has
also formed activities that more directly deal with reconciliation. The church has held

88

outdoor communion services in both communities and church members often gather to play
music at the peace wall gates that divide the two communities (McKeown 2016). These
events allow for those who might not be a part of the church to still meet with others across
the peace line and begin to form relationships with one another, as they are able to see the
things they have in common, such as a shared love of God or music (McKeown 2016).
Another event sponsored by the church is the Cross Walk, where church members
who feel so inclined are encouraged to walk through the streets of the other community
carrying a cross to symbolize a shared Christian understanding, as the cross is a symbol for
both Catholic and Protestant communities (Hope Builders International n.d.; Hurd 2019). A
church member, and former IRA member, who was interviewed after participating in the
Cross Walk discussed how the walk for him represented his own journey towards
reconciliation.
Today I carried the cross because I come from Republican West Belfast and
today is my personal token of reconciliation to the Unionist Loyalist
community and to literally raise that cross above that gun (Hurd 2019).
The work of the church is not without risk, however. As it is situated in one of the most
divided neighborhoods in all of Northern Ireland, there is still significant opposition to the
work of the church (Hope Builders International n.d.). The pastors of the church stated that
both church members and they have received many death threats in the past from people who
are opposed to the church’s work (Hope Builders International n.d.).
Although New Life City Church was not able to provide broader data on the effects
of its work on levels of violence within communities, personal testimonies from its church
members suggest that the church has had an effect at least on an individual level for many
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church members. The work of the church has led to some members of the Shankill and Falls
Road communities to leave paramilitary groups and to build relationships and reconcile with
those they once might have considered enemies.
New Life City Church has been interfaith in its mission since its founding and accepts
that risk is an inherent part of such programming. However, it should be noted that the
church was founded in 1993, only five years before the implementation of the Good Friday
Agreement. Therefore, while the church may have always been willing to accept the risk that
comes with interfaith programming in such a divided community, they may already have
been operating within a window of opportunity provided by lower levels of direct violence
across Northern Ireland leading up to the signing of the Good Friday Agreement. This may
have allowed the church to conduct programming that might have been more difficult if it
had been founded a decade or two before.

Corrymeela Community
Corrymeela Community is an interfaith community and peacebuilding organization
founded in 1965 (Davey n.d.; Tyler 2015). Corrymeela works to bring people in from divided
areas to their center in Ballycastle on the north coast of Northern Ireland where people
engage in dialogue, community building activities, and relaxation away from the conflict in
their home communities (Davey n.d.; Tyler 2015). From the start, the founder of Corrymeela,
Ray Davey, insisted on an interfaith model; he believed that only through personal contact
could humanizing relationships be created or restored between people on each side of the
conflict and reconciliation be achieved (Davey n.d.; Robinson 2015; Tyler 2015).
Corrymeela’s mission is to welcome everyone to their site, regardless of a person’s
background or faith, as they believe that through providing a safe space, people will feel
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comfortable enough to both share their own experiences and consider the experiences of
others (Davey n.d.; Robinson 2015; Tyler 2015).
Davey also believed strongly that reconciliation, trust, and forgiveness are skills that
need to be practiced at an individual level in order for them to be implemented between
people in conflict on a societal level (Corrymeela Community n.d.). By providing a variety of
opportunities for people across the religious divide to meet and interact, Corrymeela gives
people the chance to practice and experience reconciliation, trust, and forgiveness firsthand;
people can take what they learned from these small interactions at Corrymeela back to their
home communities and use them as guidance for future encounters with others (Corrymeela
Community n.d.).
Early on in the work of the Community, staff members observed that dialogue alone
was not enough to form reconciliation, trust, or forgiveness between participants, so
Corrymeela began focusing on relationship-building before dialogue; they felt that once
people were comfortable with one another, they would be able to humanize their fellow
participants and from their work towards goals like forgiveness (Corrymeela Community
n.d.). Corrymeela participant John Morrow described what it was like to practice
reconciliation across the religious divide.
We had to learn, in sometimes painful ways, to hear each other, without trying
to convince each other that ‘we were right.’ We learnt that part of
reconciliation involves living and accepting unresolved issues at times, as well
as honesty and openness (Robinson 2015, 123).
Corrymeela’s programming shifted to cater towards people at all levels, with school groups,
church groups, families, and even government officials attending their programs, which can
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range from traditional dialogue groups centered around reconciliation, storytelling workshops
to share conflict experiences and discover common ground, remembrance programs, posttrauma healing programs, faith education workshops, shared recreation activities like sports
or drama camps, and respite programs (Corrymeela Community n.d.; Davey n.d.; Robinson
2015; Tyler 2015). Corrymeela also began establishing local cell groups beyond the
Ballycastle center, where people who had volunteered at Ballycastle, or even just attended a
Corrymeela event, could take their knowledge back to their home community (Corrymeela
Community 2010; Robinson 2015). Corrymeela also describes itself as an “intentionally
Christian” space and acts of nondenominational Christian worship are incorporated in all of
their activities (Tyler 2015).
A Corrymeela staff member described the importance of having a variety of activities
beyond dialogue alone as follows:
By the early nineties, we began to understand the limitations of talk or
discussion. Often, when we evaluated the group’s experience, we would
regularly find that the group would name the creative learning and
recreational activities as having been the most important part of it. Many of
the young people and some of the adult groups had little or no experience in
and/or comfort with engaging with each other through words… In light of this
experience, we began to think more creatively about these activities. Large
elements of what had previously been termed “recreation‟, were transformed
in both content and use to become what we now know as “adventure
learning‟… These activities have become increasingly adapted and designed
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to create experiences which allow group members to enter new relationships
with one another at many different levels (Corrymeela Community n.d.).
Corrymeela also worked to remove people from conflict-heavy areas to try to prevent people,
especially young people, from being caught in violence or joining paramilitary organizations.
Corrymeela volunteer Yvonne Naylor described this part of the Community’s work.
I know in the early 1970s Corrymeela started bringing families out of areas
like Turf Lodge and Ballymurphy so that they didn’t get involved [in the
fighting]. Teenagers who were vulnerable were being brought out of the
estates and there were so many people at Corrymeela they couldn’t put them
all up, and so several local Ballycastle schools let us use their classrooms
and/or provided mattresses and bedding (Robinson 2015, 121).
Ray Davey founded Corrymeela as an interfaith community with the recognition that
interfaith programming carries with it an inherent risk within the context of Northern Ireland
(Tyler 2015). The Community has tried to mitigate the risk by providing programming that is
geographically distant from the main conflict areas, but their work is still not risk-free (Tyler
2015). Corrymeela instead operates on the principle that “nothing worth doing is without
cost” and recognizes the security risks as an inherent part of their programming that
ultimately can serve to bring participants closer through the shared experience of overcoming
fear to come together for peace (Tyler 2015). Corrymeela staff member Frank Wright
explained how the Community saw a peace agreement as vital for reducing the risk towards
participants in their interfaith programming.
[Reconciliation work] involves meeting each other across divisions in
different ways so as to undermine previous separate certainties. Such
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possibilities of meeting can often be fragile and hostage to the wider
atmosphere of inter-communal fear and violence that may be threatening or
occurring… We were always clear that a stable political settlement was vital
for cross-community trust building; without a stable political settlement the
work was always at risk. We were also aware that without a certain amount of
trust you couldn’t have a stable political settlement. Therefore, from our
earliest days we ran political conferences and members were involved in
political parties. We also had conversations with paramilitaries, encouraging
them to become constructively involved in politics and community building
(Corrymeela Community n.d.).
Although Corrymeela was not able to provide information on the specific effects of
their programming on levels of violence, they were able to provide some information
on activities that might be related to lower levels of direct violence. Firstly is
Corrymeela’s work in taking vulnerable people out of conflict-heavy areas in order to
prevent them from becoming caught up in paramilitary activity. By taking possible
combatants out of the conflict situation, Corrymeela theoretically reduced the amount
of direct violence that was able to be committed in these areas. Besides this work, the
Corrymeela Community also focused heavily on providing participants with
experiences in which they could practice trust, reconciliation, forgiveness, and
building relationships across communities. This work is likely to also be associated
with reduced levels of violence, but Corrymeela does not have any information on the
specifics of the effects of this work.
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Corrymeela has always been focused around interfaith peacebuilding. From its
start, Corrymeela’s founder, Ray Davey, was adamant in his belief that true
reconciliation could only be achieved through humanizing contact with other across
conflict lines. Corrymeela recognized that risk was an inherent part of such
programming, though risk was seen not as something that had to be completely
avoided but rather as something that could actually bond participants together. Even
so, Corrymeela was purposefully based in the countryside on the northern coast of
Northern Ireland, away from the most violent conflict areas. This provided
participants with a place of respite away from the violence as well as a safe space
where they could engage in peace and reconciliation work without facing as severe of
security risks as they might if they attempted to engage in such work within their own
communities. Therefore, while Corrymeela did not wait for a window of opportunity
in the conflict in which to begin interfaith programming, it was able to always
provide such programming by intentionally creating a safer space and by
acknowledging that risk was inevitable.

Conclusions on Interfaith Programming
Compared to the other cases of peacebuilding programming, the cases of interfaith
programming provide the most information on their effect on levels of direct violence. The
Ulster Project claims that no participants have joined paramilitary organizations, New Life
City Church has former paramilitary members worshiping together in a building that
straddles two of the most violent neighborhoods in the conflict, and the Corrymeela
Community worked during the conflict to bring vulnerable people to their center to help them
avoid becoming involved with paramilitary organizations. Reconciliation and relationship-
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building is also an important part of all three organizations’ work, which likely coincides
with lower levels of direct violence, however none of the organization were able to provide
specific information or data on any effects. Overall, while the interfaith organizations provide
slightly more support for my original hypothesis, the results are still fairly inconclusive.
In relation to my second hypothesis, all three organizations provide support for the
theory that interfaith programming becomes more common as the risks associated with it
decrease. In the cases of these three interfaith programming examples, however, all three
have been interfaith from their founding, but they all pursued interfaith programming with
the knowledge that it carried security risks for participants. The Ulster Project and the
Corrymeela Community both worked to alleviate some of the possible risks by bringing
participants out of their own communities into neutral, safe spaces to engage in interfaith
programming. The Ulster Project also specifically stated that since their founding in the
1970s, the risks associated with their programming have decreased and participants can
generally openly talk about their experiences within their home communities. New Life City
Church does not do anything specific to alleviate risks for their members, but because it was
founded in 1993, close to the time of the Good Friday Agreement, it is possible that they
were already within a good window of opportunity to pursue interfaith programming, since at
that time direct violence had decreased across Northern Ireland from earlier decades, and
they could operate with a more acceptable level of risk.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
In this study, I worked to answer the question: how effective is interfaith
peacebuilding programming compared to single-faith peacebuilding programming at
reducing the level of violence in communities facing violent religious conflict? In reviewing
the literature, I found that each form of peacebuilding programming is associated with
slightly different uses and situations, but no systematic comparison of the outcomes and
effects between these two types of programming had been done before. Utilizing contact
theory and constructivism, I hypothesized that communities facing violent religious conflict
in which members participate in interfaith peacebuilding programming will see lower levels
of violence within that community than if members participated in single-faith peacebuilding
programming. To test my hypothesis, I used a most similar systems design to analyze cases
of faith-based peacebuilding programming within Northern Ireland; I used both geographical
and temporal data on conflict deaths and cases of peacebuilding programming to conduct a
quantitative analysis of the effects as well as interviews and reports from programs and
organizations to conduct a qualitative analysis.
The geographical data showed that an increase in cases of interfaith peacebuilding is
associated with a decrease in the number of conflict deaths over time. While these results did
provide support for my hypothesis, the results also could point to a second, alternate
hypothesis: as levels of violence fall over the course of the conflict, the risks associated with
interfaith peacebuilding decrease, and interfaith peacebuilding becomes more popular and
widespread. Therefore, in looking at the interviews and reports for the individual cases of
peacebuilding programming, I analyzed each case for its support, or lack of support, in
relation to both my original and alternate hypotheses.
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Overall, there was not enough data to provide conclusive evidence in support of my
first hypothesis. Both the cases of interfaith programming and the cases that utilized both
approaches discussed reconciliation, trust, and relationship building, which are likely to be
associated with lower levels of violence, while the cases on single-faith programming
focused more on self-reflection and repentance. Additionally, the three cases of interfaith
programming were also able to provide anecdotal evidence of their work at directly
encouraging and preventing people from engaging in violence, but none of the programs
were able to provide any conclusive data on the effects of their work on levels of violence
within communities as a whole.
There was more support for my second hypothesis. Both of the cases that utilized
both approaches discussed using single-faith programming as a tool to use when the risks to
interfaith programming were too high. However, only one of the cases saw the risks as
related to the conflict environment, and in this case, the organization did wait until the
conflict situation became less violent before attempting interfaith programming as I
hypothesized. The other case saw the risks of interfaith programming coming from a lack of
maturity and preparation among participants themselves and therefore provided opportunities
for interfaith programming not as the conflict situation changed but as participants
themselves grew and changed.
Both cases of single-faith programming discussed how they used single-faith
approaches as a stepping-stone to future interfaith work; these cases also cited the need for
greater preparation, education, and open-mindedness among participants before they would
be able to properly engage in an interfaith environment. These two cases saw future interfaith
programming as necessary but did not view the communities they worked within as having
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yet reached a window of opportunity in which interfaith peacebuilding programming was
possible. Although neither of these cases of programming have yet begun utilizing interfaith
approaches, this still follows my second hypothesis that, as the situation continues to improve
in Northern Ireland, organizations currently using single-faith programming may see
opportunities to begin interfaith work.
The cases of interfaith programming also generally support my second hypothesis.
All three cases acknowledged that risk was an inherent part of their work but chose to still
use interfaith approaches because of their perceived benefit for participants. Two out of the
three cases minimized the risks for participants by conducting programming outside of their
home communities and conflict hotspots while the other likely reduced its level of risk
incidentally because it was founded closer to the signing of the Good Friday Agreement.
These cases all support the idea that interfaith programming is associated with risks, but none
of these programs felt the need to wait for improvements in the conflict situation, at least not
on purpose, to begin their work. Instead, they recognized risk as inherent while finding ways
within their programming structure to reduce any risks to an acceptable level for participants.

Implications
Despite the lack of concrete data on the effects of faith-based programming on levels
of violence from programs and organizations conducting such programming, one clear
observation was that, in all seven of the cases analyzed, interfaith peacebuilding was the
ultimate programming goal because of the perceived benefits for reconciliation, humanizing
others, building trust, and building relationships. This matches what both contact theory and
constructivism have to say about faith-based peacebuilding; although single-faith
peacebuilding can help participants begin to develop a desire for peace and reconciliation,
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only direct contact with others across conflict lines can actually create it. Contact with others
in peacebuilding programming provides opportunities for participants to humanize one
another and build trusting relationships that often even extend into the wider community, all
of which happens through changing the norms of interaction between parties and their
understanding of the conflict and their place within it. Single-faith programming can be
useful for reducing security risks faced by participants or helping participants prepare for
future interfaith contact, but single-faith programming on its own is not enough to create
lasting, peaceful relationships within divided communities.
For programs and organizations conducting faith-based peacebuilding programming,
this study shows the need for more data collection on program outcomes and effectiveness
for participants and wider communities. Additionally, more systematic data collection is
needed overall to catalog programs and organizations conducting faith-based peacebuilding
programming within a city, area, or country. Better data could lead to clearer conclusions
about what forms of programming generally, and even what aspects within certain cases of
programming specifically, lead to lower levels of violence.

Limitations
Although this study provided further confirmation that interfaith peacebuilding is
more useful for fostering trust, reconciliation, and relationships among participants, more
data is needed in order to answer the question of what effects faith-based peacebuilding has
on levels of violence within communities. Although the analysis of geographical data clearly
showed an inverse relationship between the number of cases of interfaith peacebuilding and
the number of conflict deaths, a lack of data from programs and organizations conducting
faith-based peacebuilding programming on the effects of their programming made it difficult
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to definitively state whether my original or alternate hypothesis was true. Although the
analysis of the cases of programming provided more support for my alternate hypothesis, the
sample size of cases for which I was able to conduct interviews or find enough other reports
in order to perform a qualitative analysis was small compared to the number of cases I was
able to include in my geographical data analysis.
A lack of systematic data on faith-based peacebuilding programming within Northern
Ireland in general also meant that I had to create my own dataset of cases of programming
from a variety of scholarly articles, webpages, and news articles related to peacebuilding in
Northern Ireland. This means that there are likely more cases of programming that were not
included in this study, especially if they were smaller or short-lived and therefore less likely
to be included in one of these resources.
Additionally, the fact that this study was conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic
proved challenging for data collection. Many websites of programs and organizations that
conduct faith-based programming had notices that their offices were closed due to the
pandemic and contact might be delayed. I believe this may have led to fewer responses for
interview or information requests than I originally anticipated, and in one case did result in
an interview cancellation.

Suggestions for Future Research
In order to provide an even clearer look at the effect of different forms of faith-based
programming on levels of violence, future studies could expand on the analysis of
geographical data that I conducted. Including Northern Irish census data on population within
areas over time, and even on levels of community segregation if available, as well as
controlling for these variables within the statistical analysis, could provide a more accurate
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look at the effects of programming. Although the fixed effects model included in my analysis
helped to control for things such as differences in population in areas over time, including
census data directly would provide the most accurate results.
Future research could also expand on the dataset of cases of faith-based programming
in Northern Ireland. Because I believe that there are likely smaller or more short-lived
programs that I could include in my dataset based on the resources available to me, future
research could be conducted to delve deeper into smaller local news sources or community
and church archives. This could provide an even more complete picture of the landscape of
faith-based peacebuilding in Northern Ireland and thereby also provide even more accurate
results.
Lastly, in order to better answer my original and/or alternate hypothesis, more
interviews and reports could be collected and analyzed from other cases of peacebuilding
programming not included in the qualitative analysis of this study. More case analyses would
also help to determine how generalizable the results I found in support of my alternate
hypothesis are to Northern Ireland more widely. This study could also be replicated for other
cases of religious violence in which faith-based peacebuilding played a role to determine
how generalizable my results are to other contexts outside of Northern Ireland.
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Appendix A: Interview Documents
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Research Protocol
Background information
For my independent study, I am researching the effectiveness of single-faith versus
interfaith peacebuilding programming at reducing levels of violence in communities facing
violent religious conflict. Although existing research exists analyzing the effectiveness of
each form of faith-based peacebuilding on their own, there is no existing literature directly
comparing the two. In order to compare the two methods of faith-based peacebuilding
programming, I am using a comparative case study approach to look at both single-faith and
interfaith peacebuilding programming within the conflict in Northern Ireland.
Specific aims of my research
The goal of my research is to ask: how effective is single-faith peacebuilding
programming compared to interfaith peacebuilding programming at reducing levels of
violence in communities facing violent religious conflict? Through interviews, I hope to
gather more information on how effective program leaders or participants believe single-faith
or interfaith programs to be at reducing violence and fostering trust and reconciliation as well
as on what specific aspects of programming they believe led to these outcomes.
Location where the research will be conducted
Interviews will all be conducted remotely through video calls.
With whom the data and/or conclusions will be shared
Data and conclusions of this study will be shared with my advisor, second reader, and
the review board if requested. Excerpts of data may eventually be shared with the students
and faculty at the College of Wooster through my research presentation, and a finished copy
of my independent study will be available to read at the College’s library after its completion.
Methodology of your study
I will contact a variety of peacebuilding or religious organizations in Northern Ireland
based on whether their website or other sources, such as news articles, discuss their faithbased peacebuilding work. I will ask whether I can interview people associated with their
organization or program who helped lead or participated in faith-based peacebuilding
programming. I plan to interview people who have experience with single-faith
peacebuilding programming as well as those who have experience with interfaith, aiming for
an equal number of both. I will use the interview responses to look for whether common
themes are expressed by those who have experience with single-faith programming as well as
those with interfaith regarding the effectiveness of each. Additionally, I will analyze
responses to see whether one form of faith-based peacebuilding is considered more effective.
At the start of each interview, I will introduce myself and remind the interviewee
about the purpose of the interview. I will hand over an informed consent form to be read and
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signed. Once informed consent has been granted, I will proceed to ask the following
questions, recording answers using a voice recorder if the interviewees give permission or by
hand (pen and paper) if not:
Faith-based peacebuilding efforts can broadly be defined either as single-faith or interfaith. I
am considering single-faith peacebuilding programming to be any in which participants are
primarily part of the same faith tradition and interfaith programming to be any involving
participants from more than one faith tradition.
1. Would you describe the program as primarily single-faith, interfaith, or some
combination of both approaches?
a. (If a combination): What aspects were primarily single-faith? What aspects
were interfaith?
2. Could you describe the structure of the program?
a. What kinds of activities or dialogue did participants/you engage in?
3. Could you describe who participated in the program?
a. What was/were the primary religious background(s) or affiliation(s) of
participants?
b. (For interfaith programming): How was the group made up in terms of
percentages of participants from different religious backgrounds or
affiliations?
4. (For leaders): Could you describe your role within the programming?
5. How effective do you think the programming was at fostering trust or reconciliation
among participants and within the wider community?
a. How do you know that?
6. Do you think the programming had an effect on levels of violence within the
community?
a. If so, can you describe the effect?
7. What aspects of the programming did you find most effective?
8. What, if any, aspects of the programming, do you think, if changed or improved,
could have led to more effective outcomes?
9. Did the wider community support the programming work?
a. How do you know?
b. Did participants/you feel safe participating in the programming?
10. Do you think the programming had lasting effects on the participants/you and/or on
the wider community?
a. If so, in what way?
11. Have you ever participated in any other programs that you would consider to be
interfaith/single-faith (whatever is opposite to what we have been discussing)?
a. If so, how did your experiences with the programming compare?
b. Did you find one more effective than the other?
i. If so, why?
12. Is there anything we did not discuss that you would like to share or follow up on?
13. Is there anyone else you think that I should talk to?
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Storage and handling of audio recordings and handwritten notes from interviews
Audio recordings and transcriptions will be stored on a password-protected computer,
and any handwritten notes will be stored in a safe location. All recordings and handwritten
notes will be destroyed at the completion of my independent study.
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CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY
THE COLLEGE OF WOOSTER
Analyzing the Effectiveness of Single-Faith versus Interfaith Peacebuilding in Violent
Religious Conflict
Principal Investigator: Sydney Maureen Hanes, College of Wooster Department of Political
Science
Purpose
You are being asked to participate in an interview by Maureen Hanes for her Independent
Study, a senior capstone thesis at the College of Wooster. The purpose of this project is to
analyze the effectiveness of single-faith versus interfaith peacebuilding programming at
reducing levels of violence within communities facing violent religious conflict.
Procedures
If you decide to volunteer, you will be asked to answer several questions about your
involvement with faith-based peacebuilding programming. Each interview will take
approximately 30 to 40 minutes to complete.
Risks
There is a possibility that some interview questions might trigger memories of violence, as
some questions may cause participants to revisit difficult experiences during the conflict and
peacebuilding process.
Benefits
There are no direct benefits to you for your participation. An indirect benefit is that we learn
more about the effectiveness of different forms of faith-based peacebuilding.
Compensation
There will not be compensation for participation in this study.
Confidentiality
All information that you provide will be held confidential. You will only be referenced in the
final study by your position or affiliation with the programming in which you have
experience, unless you otherwise request to be named.
Costs
There is no cost to you beyond the time and effort required to complete the interview
described above.
Right to Refuse or Withdraw
You may refuse to participate in the study. If you decide to participate, you may change your
mind about being in the study and withdraw at any point during the experiment.
Questions
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If you have any questions, please ask. If you have additional questions later, you can contact
me by email at shanes21@wooster.edu You may also contact my advisor, Dr. Matt Krain, at
mkrain@wooster.edu.
Consent to be Interviewed
Your signature below will indicate that you have decided to volunteer to be interviewed, that
you have read and understand the information provided above, and that you are at least 18
years of age.
Signature of participant ________________________ Date _______________
Consent to Have Interview Audio Recorded
Your signature below indicates that you consent to having this interview audio recorded to
ensure accuracy in the transcription of answers. You may choose not to have it audio
recorded in which case I will take notes of your responses by hand. All recordings and notes
will be destroyed at the completion of the study.
Signature of participant ________________________ Date _______________
You will be provided a copy of this form.
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Appendix B: GIS Data Map
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